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The blockchain could provide a timestamp, but it's hard to see how that would help. Every type of video authentication system I've ever heard proposed can be d
by michaelt 7y ago
The blockchain could provide a timestamp, but it's hard to see how that would help.
Every type of video authentication system I've ever heard proposed can be defeated by simply pointing a 'trusted' video camera at a screen playing a fake video.
- TomMarius 7y agoIn real world you could have an event that happened under five different, unaffiliated cameras. If all of these match up, that seems to be something a judge should consider.
- cwkoss 7y agoI was chatting with someone about making deep-fake-resistant video. An interesting solution that came up was making artifacts that would be hard to simulate: ex. surround the speaker is a swirling vortex of confetti, where words have a minimal but detectable effects on the air currents. Video could be 'authenticated' by post facto tracking of particles to validate both continuity and plausible velocity deltas based on generated model of air currents. It wouldn't eliminate the possibility of deepfakes, but would drastically increase cost of production. Similarly, I predict that cameras will increase in resolution past the point of utility for human vision: tetrapixel camera video would be extremely expensive to produce without leaving tiny artifacts.
- tomarr 7y agoI suppose you could have 'trusted devices' where upon taking pictures/videos a hash of the file is committed to blockchain. Although a privacy nightmare. This obviously wouldn't solve the 'no fake videos' problem but would least mean 'this video isn't fake' for a select subset. There could be tiers of information in the future where this audited media is weighted higher.
- xiphias2 7y agoCommiting a timestamping hash is not a privacy nightmare, as you don’t need to reveal the evidence until you need to use it for proving what happened.
- Reason077 7y ago"Every type of video authentication system I've ever heard proposed can be defeated by simply pointing a 'trusted' video camera at a screen playing a fake video." That's a good point. But I'm imagining situations where the camera itself is a reasonably secure device. For example, a city CCTV camera or a police body worn camera. If a video stream can be securely (cryptographically) matched to a particular device, with an unforgeable (blockchain?) timestamp, it would increase confidence in video evidence presented in court, for example.