> it reveals to eavesdroppers what DNS servers you're talking to Yes, they (probably the ISP) can do traffic analysis - which is a significant risk - but they

> it reveals to eavesdroppers what DNS servers you're talking to Yes, they (probably the ISP) can do traffic analysis - which is a significant risk - but they are prevented from learning the contents fo the query which puts a limit on what they can learn. Also, the same eavesdroppers can see the TCP connection to the HTTPS server that follows he DNS request. Also, I should have mentioned that while performing recursive resolution locally does provide some actual privacy protections, it is not perfect. Name resolution as a distributed database fundamentally requires leaking some information to the servers that have the information. As long as we resolve names with anything similar to existing DNS, the best we can do is try to limit the damage to privacy. In a perfect world, we would probably use something similar to TOR to perform name resolution. Lots of inputs that onion-route queries to the actual nameservers. > it reveals to DNS operators what your IP is. Revealing my IP to ns.example.com is redundant when I'm almost certainly following the DNS request with a connection to www.example.com; the authoritative server for a domain is controlled (directly or indirectly) by the same org that controls the domain's HTTPS/etc servers.