3 ms·
Here's what the RFC[0] says about it: >Two primary use cases were considered during this protocol's development. These use cases are preventing on-path devices
by dqv 7y ago
Here's what the RFC[0] says about it:
>Two primary use cases were considered during this protocol's development. These use cases are preventing on-path devices from interfering with DNS operations, and also allowing web applications to access DNS information via existing browser APIs in a safe way consistent with Cross Origin Resource Sharing [...]
[0]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8484#page-3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8484#page-3
- dTal 7y agoI don't see how on-path devices could distinguish between DNS-over-HTTPS and DNS-over-TLS, provided they were run on the same port. It's just an encrypted socketed connection. As for web apps... well, that's horrifying enough to be the real reason. Javascript should not be running its own DNS queries, outside of the system DNS settings - it's a layering violation that looks a lot like an end run around the "user agent" concept (i.e. the web app, rather than the browser itself, is the "trusted endpoint" and the user is considered an adversary). If web browsers actually wanted such functionality to be available, they could easily expose an API for it.
- catalogia 7y ago> "allowing web applications to access DNS information via existing browser APIs in a safe way consistent with Cross Origin Resource Sharing [...]" What justifications for this exist?