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I think speculative execution is in principle incompatible with untrusted code execution. Even if CPU makers will place memory protection in front of speculativ
by baybal2 7y ago
I think speculative execution is in principle incompatible with untrusted code execution. Even if CPU makers will place memory protection in front of speculative execution, and not behind as it is now, any untrusted code/bytecode can still pwn the process running it, and there is no way to work that around as such.
- ben-schaaf 7y agoIf the only thing in the process is the untrusted code (+ interpreter) then there's nothing to pwn.
- baybal2 7y agoIndeed, and that's the reason why a lot of current "sandboxing" efforts are rather misguided. There is no reason to filter syscalls from some kind of bytecode with an interpreter run with full privileges if you simply run all of that unprivileged and you already have all syscall hardened and ACLed. But for as long as there is a remotest possibility of a process being able to get around MMU, there is no reason to do that either.
- leni536 7y agoThe problem is not the speculative execution. It's the observable side effects.
- monocasa 7y agoWith current CPUs, yes. Adding either a speculation barrier instruction, or even better, more fine grain ways than a process to describe memory protections (like segmentation) would go a long way.
- d1zzy 7y agoIt's more like how having JavaScript enabled in a browser is "in principle incompatible with untrusted execution". That is to say, yes, you are technically right, but at the same time the benefits are great so we are still pursuing that approach while at the same time fighting an arms race of finding and closing any security issues this design introduces.