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Better provenance is the way to guard against fakes. For video and audio, I imagine a combination of hardware signing, perhaps with the camera itself living on
by filoeleven 7y ago
Better provenance is the way to guard against fakes.
For video and audio, I imagine a combination of hardware signing, perhaps with the camera itself living on an isolated, Secure Enclave-like chip, and sending hashes of (incoming images/video * deviceID * trustedTimestamp) to a blockchain or some other public distributed ledger. Getting the timestamp from a service that keeps its own record adds further security.
This obviously requires an internet connection, and would likely be useful mostly for news and government agencies, law enforcement. But if the culture is affected enough by deepfakes, I can imagine it becoming more ubiquitous. The parts are all there, it’s a question of utility.
- jimmydorry 7y agoIf you are trusting a camera to upload to a blockchain, the same can be simulated on a computer, given enough time.
- filoeleven 7y agoSure, that’s the reason for including the 3rd-party timestamp AND for keeping the device signing keys on a separate secure chip. The idea is to say “these images/sounds were recorded at this time by this device,” and to have that statement both registered publicly at the time of creation and backed by the reputation of the device maker. It’s acknowledging that using AI to catch AI fakes is a fool’s errand, and relies instead on the premise that hashing a raw data stream is much faster than producing a good fake, and that a secure device key is secure. You’d need both for it to work, otherwise you can generate a deepfake beforehand and get the device to sign a fake stream. That may be easier to do than I think; this is not my area of expertise.