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spectre v2, like v1, isn't one that is "fixable." The mitigations (retpoline & microcode updates) are essentially additions that are added in places where secur

spectre v2, like v1, isn't one that is "fixable." The mitigations (retpoline & microcode updates) are essentially additions that are added in places where security checks are done to just disable speculation for that particular check. But you still have to choose when & where to use those or even if you opt to use them at all. There are no sweeping fixes for either v1 or v2, and there probably won't be for a long time at best. But the positive news is that v1 & v2 only matter at all if you do in-process sandboxing of untrusted code. Which most things don't do, so most things are not at any risk from it.

rrss 7y ago
> But the positive news is that v1 & v2 only matter at all if you do in-process sandboxing of untrusted code. I don't think this is accurate. It seems to be a widespread misunderstanding that started because the original proof of concept was within a single process. Spectre, before mitigations, allowed userspace to read kernel memory if appropriate gadgets in the kernel could be identified and exploited. My understanding is the impact is only intra-process after mitigations.