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I think that a secret ballot is fundamentally incompatible with an incorruptible voting system. As long as an individual cannot check that their vote has been p

I think that a secret ballot is fundamentally incompatible with an incorruptible voting system. As long as an individual cannot check that their vote has been properly recorded, which ballot secrecy renders impossible, there will be room for shenanigans. Such secrecy clearly has benefits, like preventing much in the way of paying, or intimidating, for votes. But it also has a clear cost, namely in reducing the trustworthiness of the results. I'd choose trustworthiness, but I understand why many choose secrecy instead. I'd sure like to be convinced that this isn't such a dilemma and that there's a way to have both. But a marginally better voting machine isn't it.

docdeek 7y ago
Australia has a secret ballot and uses paper ballots, as does France. I’ve voted in both countries and both see you drop a piece of paper into a ballot box, and both have seen me offered to hang around after the vote is complete to help count (I’ve not been able to find the time to do this in Australia where it would be watching more than counting, but in France I got to help count the vote). While I never saw ‘my’ vote, the process was such that it was a secret who I voted for, there was a hard copy of my vote, and it was more-or-less impossible for my vote not to be counted (marked off on a list of voters at the moment of voting, had to show ID to vote in France). If the machines won’t offer a solution, maybe a traditional paper and pencil (Australia) or simple piece of paper in an envelope (France) could do it.
danso 7y ago
> I think that a secret ballot is fundamentally incompatible with an incorruptible voting system. I don't understand this statement. In the following paragraph, you state yourself the problems of a non-secret ballot: "paying, or intimidating, for votes". Why do you not see that – arguably the most obvious form of a corrupt voting system" as "fundamentally incompatible with an incorruptible voting system"? edit: fwiw, the machine described in this article uses a paper ballot, which the voter can review before putting it in the ballot box. But I assume you're arguing that the voter still doesn't know that their vote will be recorded in the official count, without a system that ties and tracks each ballot to a voter ID.
- hirundo 7y ago
  Paying or intimidating for votes is retail corruption. Changing the votes somewhere post ballot is wholesale corruption. I think both are serious problems but that wholesale corruption is somewhat more serious. That's just a gut feeling, informed largely by my bias toward transparency. But I have no contempt for someone whose gut leans the other way.
  - danso 7y ago
    I don't disagree with you in theory, but in practice, a public ballot would likely chill voter behavior whether or not direct payments or bribery were involved. Particularly among groups and organizations like unions and churches. Or hell, your employer and your family.
ScottFree 7y ago
I don't see how a secret ballet couldn't still be checked later by the voter. If we're talking paper ballots, then each ballot could have a unique id printed on it. The voter could either write the number down or the ballot could have a "receipt" section you tear off and keep. The numbers could be recorded as they're being counted and published later. The voter could then check to make sure his or her vote was counted appropriately. This would be even easier digitally.
- hirundo 7y ago
  If you can't prove that the unique id is associated with a particular voter, it isn't good enough because it can't prove that their vote was altered. If it can be associated with a particular voter, it can be used as proof to satisfy a vote buyer or intimidator. However it does have the advantage of not being entirely public, making the voter less open to influence or retribution by family, employers, etc.
  - ScottFree 7y ago
    > If you can't prove that the unique id is associated with a particular voter, it isn't good enough because it can't prove that their vote was altered. It's up to the voter to confirm their vote was counted correctly.
    - pintxo 7y ago
      And then what? It will be your word of “I voted A” against the factual “B” on the paper.
      - ScottFree 7y ago
        The whole point is to ensure your vote gets counted correctly, yes? If you wanted to vote Democrat and discover your id in the Republican column, you let somebody know. Then they re-check the ballot and can say "no, you marked Republican. That was your mistake and we didn't count it wrong." Or they'll say "gee golly, yes, we counted your vote wrong. Our mistake. We'll correct the counts." If your id isn't in either column, you also let somebody know so you can re-vote. This makes sure your vote doesn't get "misplaced", either by malice or incompetence.
tzs 7y ago
> I'd sure like to be convinced that this isn't such a dilemma and that there's a way to have both Take a look at end-to-end auditable voting systems [1]. In particular, look at some of the specific E2E systems that article links to, such as Scantegrity II. These systems allow individual voters to check that their vote was properly recorded, but do not provide a way for the individual to prove to someone else that their vote was or was not cast for any particular candidate. They also typically provide for allowing any third party to verify the vote tallies. Scantegrity is particularly interesting, because it is an add-on to existing optical scan voting systems. All the magic is in how the ballots are prepared. This means that it could be adopted in many jurisdictions without requiring buying a lot of new voting equipment. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy...

docdeek 7y ago

Australia has a secret ballot and uses paper ballots, as does France. I’ve voted in both countries and both see you drop a piece of paper into a ballot box, and both have seen me offered to hang around after the vote is complete to help count (I’ve not been able to find the time to do this in Australia where it would be watching more than counting, but in France I got to help count the vote). While I never saw ‘my’ vote, the process was such that it was a secret who I voted for, there was a hard copy of my vote, and it was more-or-less impossible for my vote not to be counted (marked off on a list of voters at the moment of voting, had to show ID to vote in France). If the machines won’t offer a solution, maybe a traditional paper and pencil (Australia) or simple piece of paper in an envelope (France) could do it.

danso 7y ago

> I think that a secret ballot is fundamentally incompatible with an incorruptible voting system. I don't understand this statement. In the following paragraph, you state yourself the problems of a non-secret ballot: "paying, or intimidating, for votes". Why do you not see that – arguably the most obvious form of a corrupt voting system" as "fundamentally incompatible with an incorruptible voting system"? edit: fwiw, the machine described in this article uses a paper ballot, which the voter can review before putting it in the ballot box. But I assume you're arguing that the voter still doesn't know that their vote will be recorded in the official count, without a system that ties and tracks each ballot to a voter ID.

hirundo 7y ago
Paying or intimidating for votes is retail corruption. Changing the votes somewhere post ballot is wholesale corruption. I think both are serious problems but that wholesale corruption is somewhat more serious. That's just a gut feeling, informed largely by my bias toward transparency. But I have no contempt for someone whose gut leans the other way.
- danso 7y ago
  I don't disagree with you in theory, but in practice, a public ballot would likely chill voter behavior whether or not direct payments or bribery were involved. Particularly among groups and organizations like unions and churches. Or hell, your employer and your family.

ScottFree 7y ago

I don't see how a secret ballet couldn't still be checked later by the voter. If we're talking paper ballots, then each ballot could have a unique id printed on it. The voter could either write the number down or the ballot could have a "receipt" section you tear off and keep. The numbers could be recorded as they're being counted and published later. The voter could then check to make sure his or her vote was counted appropriately. This would be even easier digitally.

hirundo 7y ago
If you can't prove that the unique id is associated with a particular voter, it isn't good enough because it can't prove that their vote was altered. If it can be associated with a particular voter, it can be used as proof to satisfy a vote buyer or intimidator. However it does have the advantage of not being entirely public, making the voter less open to influence or retribution by family, employers, etc.
- ScottFree 7y ago
  > If you can't prove that the unique id is associated with a particular voter, it isn't good enough because it can't prove that their vote was altered. It's up to the voter to confirm their vote was counted correctly.
  - pintxo 7y ago
    And then what? It will be your word of “I voted A” against the factual “B” on the paper.
    - ScottFree 7y ago
      The whole point is to ensure your vote gets counted correctly, yes? If you wanted to vote Democrat and discover your id in the Republican column, you let somebody know. Then they re-check the ballot and can say "no, you marked Republican. That was your mistake and we didn't count it wrong." Or they'll say "gee golly, yes, we counted your vote wrong. Our mistake. We'll correct the counts." If your id isn't in either column, you also let somebody know so you can re-vote. This makes sure your vote doesn't get "misplaced", either by malice or incompetence.

tzs 7y ago

> I'd sure like to be convinced that this isn't such a dilemma and that there's a way to have both Take a look at end-to-end auditable voting systems [1]. In particular, look at some of the specific E2E systems that article links to, such as Scantegrity II. These systems allow individual voters to check that their vote was properly recorded, but do not provide a way for the individual to prove to someone else that their vote was or was not cast for any particular candidate. They also typically provide for allowing any third party to verify the vote tallies. Scantegrity is particularly interesting, because it is an add-on to existing optical scan voting systems. All the magic is in how the ballots are prepared. This means that it could be adopted in many jurisdictions without requiring buying a lot of new voting equipment. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy...