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AMD processors were also vulnerable to spectre v2. I don't know the status of the mitigations or whether it was fixed in zen 2. EDIT: I found the list I made
by rrss 7y ago
AMD processors were also vulnerable to spectre v2. I don't know the status of the mitigations or whether it was fixed in zen 2.
EDIT:
I found the list I made a few months back. no guarantees, but i think it is mostly accurate.
Meltdown: Intel, IBM, some ARM
Spectre v1: Intel, ARM, IBM, AMD
Spectre v2: Intel, ARM, IBM, AMD
Spectre v3a: Intel, ARM
Spectre v4: Intel, ARM, IBM, AMD
L1TF: Intel, IBM
Meltdown-PK: Intel
Spectre-PHT: Intel, ARM, AMD
Meltdown-BND: Intel, AMD
MDS: Intel
RIDL: Intel
- wolf550e 7y agoL1TF was an incredibly stupid bug in Intel's L1 cache implementation. I very much doubt IBM's POWER chips had the same issue. Do you have any source for this?
- Twirrim 7y agoQuoting from https://www.ibm.com/blogs/psirt/potential-impact-processors-power-family/ https://www.ibm.com/blogs/psirt/potential-impact-processors-... "On August 15, 2018, security vulnerabilities codenamed Foreshadow/L1TF (CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646 and CVE-2018-3615) were announced. Two of the vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-3620 and CVE-2018-3646) could potentially impact Power Systems. The Firmware and OS patches released by IBM in February and March 2018 to address the original Meltdown vulnerability (CVE-2017-5754) also address the L1TF/Foreshadow vulnerability, except for Power 9 Systems running with KVM Hypervisor. OS patch for Power 9 KVM Systems will be made available soon. The Firmware and OS patches for all other Power Systems are available in this blog below. The third L1TF/Foreshadow vulnerability (CVE-2018-3615) relates to SGX implementation and does not impact the Power Systems."
- wolf550e 7y agoThank you! L1TF is this: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-intel-analysis-l1-terminal-fault https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insigh... I'm surprised IBM did this. I thought better of them.
- kllrnohj 7y agospectre v2, like v1, isn't one that is "fixable." The mitigations (retpoline & microcode updates) are essentially additions that are added in places where security checks are done to just disable speculation for that particular check. But you still have to choose when & where to use those or even if you opt to use them at all. There are no sweeping fixes for either v1 or v2, and there probably won't be for a long time at best. But the positive news is that v1 & v2 only matter at all if you do in-process sandboxing of untrusted code. Which most things don't do, so most things are not at any risk from it.
- rrss 7y ago> But the positive news is that v1 & v2 only matter at all if you do in-process sandboxing of untrusted code. I don't think this is accurate. It seems to be a widespread misunderstanding that started because the original proof of concept was within a single process. Spectre, before mitigations, allowed userspace to read kernel memory if appropriate gadgets in the kernel could be identified and exploited. My understanding is the impact is only intra-process after mitigations.