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TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
- banana_smoothie 7y agoThe link to the paper[1] is a 404. Did anyone manage to grab a copy of the paper? I haven't thought about lattices since gradschool crypto classes, and was excited to see if I could comprehend anything after 10 years. :( [1]: http://tpm.fail/TPM-FAIL.pdf http://tpm.fail/TPM-FAIL.pdf
- moyix 7y agoIt appears to be here now: http://tpm.fail/tpmfail.pdf http://tpm.fail/tpmfail.pdf
- banana_smoothie 7y agoThanks!
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- dfox 7y agoIn my view this is some kind of argument as for why you should not (ab)use TPM as general purpose HSM (ie. for something that it is not designed for) and it does not say much about the security when it is used correctly (as a local attacker that has TPM in state where it will sign literally anything I throw at it, what exactly does key recovery attack buy me?)
- tedunangst 7y agoNot sure why you'd say it's not designed for this. They call out the fact that it was specifically certified for such use and to be resistant to such attacks.
- jgalt212 7y agoIs there a good reason for a security conscious hi value target shop to use VMs or docker when they don't control the whole box?
- munchbunny 7y agoThat depends on what you are protecting, but in general if you are high-value enough that it's worth it for somebody to try to attack you through VM instances sharing the physical machine, you should be managing your own hardware and using physical HSM's to protect keys.
- GoodGOYIM 7y agoDELTE THIS, BAD GOYIM
- baroffoos 7y agoDoes this allow users to install custom OSs on devices with verified boot chains like game consoles and phones?
- vermilingua 7y agoIf I’m reading this correctly, it means the private key of a certificate is leaked during generation. Boot chains rely on the verification of certificates and signed data, not signing. So no.
- baroffoos 7y agoSo this lets you grab the key on your own device which is used to encrypt the storage but not the OEM key used to sign the firmware image?
- dlgeek 7y agoAlmost. s/encrypt the storage/sign the remote attestation document/. Storage would be encrypted with a symmetric AES key, this only leaks asymmetric ECDSA signing keys
- dlgeek 7y agoNo. There are two different things, Secure Boot (which prevents the device from running unsigned software) and Trusted Boot (where the device can run anything but can prove to a remote party that it's running a specific software). Because this would only leak private keys inside the device, you can only attack Trusted Boot (where producing trusted signatures is important), not Secure Boot (which only verifies signatures that were produced elsewhere).
- locacorten 7y agoI have not read the paper, and I could be wrong. However, these appear to be attacks against the crypto implemented inside a TPM/fTPM. The reference implementation of TPM 2.0 leaves the choice of the crypto library up to the platform vendor. If my suspicions are correct, it sounds like some of the platform vendors decided to use crypto libraries vulnerable to timing attacks. Hmmm...
- xyzzyz 7y agoIf you look at IBM's TPM 2.0 implementation[1], you can see that they don't use any well tested libraries for crypto primitives, but rather uses what looks like home-cooked crypto implementation. Microsoft, on the other hand, seems to support OpenSSL and wolfSSL in their simulator[2]. [1] - http://ibmswtpm.sourceforge.net/ibmswtpm2.html http://ibmswtpm.sourceforge.net/ibmswtpm2.html [2] - https://github.com/microsoft/ms-tpm-20-ref https://github.com/microsoft/ms-tpm-20-ref
- wolf550e 7y agoYou're not supposed to use the IBM TPM emulator for anything except developing software that talks to a real TPM without using a real TPM.
- matthewaveryusa 7y agoIBM's implementation is really scary. I read through the codebase and my WTF meter went through the roof. It looks like the codebase of some evil genius that invented a world of coding practices of his own.
- wolf550e 7y agoTo me this sounds like exactly the same as Minerva [1][2] but in TPM instead of in smart card. 1 - https://minerva.crocs.fi.muni.cz/ https://minerva.crocs.fi.muni.cz/ 2 - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21147865 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21147865
- brohee 7y agoI think Paul Kocher first published about timing attacks in 1996 (https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=706156 https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=706156). The fact that industry giants not only sold them, but got them certified says a lot about how much assurance CC and FIPS evaluation buys you...
- rocqua 7y agoAre there many uses of signing with a TPM on consumer hardware? I can see the issue with servers, but not much else.
- brohee 7y agohttps://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/informatio... It's used to store th private key of user certificates, but those are PIN protected presumably. But a key that isn't supposed to be extractible may well be so.
- tinus_hn 7y agoThe TPM can be used to store and protect Bitlocker keys.
- nosuchgroup 7y agoThe PoC mentioned in the ZDNet article (https://www.zdnet.com/article/tpm-fail-vulnerabilities-impact-tpm-chips-in-desktops-laptops-servers/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/tpm-fail-vulnerabilities-impac...) seems to be out... https://github.com/VernamGroup/TPM-Fail/ https://github.com/VernamGroup/TPM-Fail/
- devnullbyte 7y agoThat code is nonsense. It's a perl script that messes around with cowsay and does not make a single tpm command.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- moyix 7y agoYeah, that code is a hoax. The code isn't available yet, but when it is it will be here: https://github.com/VernamLab/TPM-Fail https://github.com/VernamLab/TPM-Fail