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Dumb question - as a dev on OSX (not yet migrated to Catalina), I compile and run my own code all the time. I also install a ton of binaries, like the Rust inst

Dumb question - as a dev on OSX (not yet migrated to Catalina), I compile and run my own code all the time. I also install a ton of binaries, like the Rust installation manager. Would I see any issue here? I suspect everything I write or "install" via curl/bash/etc will be fine. Eg, if it's a downloaded binary in my $PATH, I expect it to continue to work. So if that's the case.. why is Apple being so harsh about all of this? I feel like malware will just move to curl scripts and all Apple succeeded at was making normal Apps more difficult to develop. I imagine some might argue that users will be somewhat informed, and will know not to run stuff in a Terminal. Cool.... but, how many times have we seen non-technical folks run stuff in the Windows command prompt? They can be walked through a malware installation process a thousand times over. So is Apple going to lock the entire platform down? Are they going to limit my ability to run binaries? My own and others? Because if they don't, this all feels pointless. And if they do, i'l _be forced_ to switch to Linux. I don't like you these days Apple. What is wrong with you.

dwaite 7y ago
When you download an app through a browser, it will set a quarantine file system attribute. By default, clearing this bit requires the app to be notarized. The user can also right-click open to allow an app to run, add a third-party certificate as trusted, or disable Gatekeeper altogether from the command-line. I believe Catalina also will be periodic checks to make sure the binary hasn't been modified. If you don't distribute software off of your own machine, you do not have to think about signing at all. The rust installation manager and cargo do not set the quarantine attribute, so there is nothing for quarantine to check when binaries are run.
dwaite 7y ago
> So if that's the case.. why is Apple being so harsh about all of this? I feel like malware will just move to curl scripts and all Apple succeeded at was making normal Apps more difficult to develop. The goal is to prevent users from running untrusted applications or mistrusted applications like trojans. If you can convince the user to click through a security warning or run commands from the terminal, then the user themselves have taken responsibility for evaluating trust. The current system does depend on the user having appropriate 'spidey sense' to what the developer is asking them to do - the yardstick is a certain level of informed consent. If malware driving the user through terminal prompts becomes a significant user problem, that may unfortunately lead to the system being locked down further. FWIW, other more serious changes (such as disabling SIP) go beyond a terminal command or requiring a password, to requiring you to reboot onto the rescue partition. Here, they are requiring a much higher degree of informed user consent.

dwaite 7y ago

When you download an app through a browser, it will set a quarantine file system attribute. By default, clearing this bit requires the app to be notarized. The user can also right-click open to allow an app to run, add a third-party certificate as trusted, or disable Gatekeeper altogether from the command-line. I believe Catalina also will be periodic checks to make sure the binary hasn't been modified. If you don't distribute software off of your own machine, you do not have to think about signing at all. The rust installation manager and cargo do not set the quarantine attribute, so there is nothing for quarantine to check when binaries are run.

dwaite 7y ago

> So if that's the case.. why is Apple being so harsh about all of this? I feel like malware will just move to curl scripts and all Apple succeeded at was making normal Apps more difficult to develop. The goal is to prevent users from running untrusted applications or mistrusted applications like trojans. If you can convince the user to click through a security warning or run commands from the terminal, then the user themselves have taken responsibility for evaluating trust. The current system does depend on the user having appropriate 'spidey sense' to what the developer is asking them to do - the yardstick is a certain level of informed consent. If malware driving the user through terminal prompts becomes a significant user problem, that may unfortunately lead to the system being locked down further. FWIW, other more serious changes (such as disabling SIP) go beyond a terminal command or requiring a password, to requiring you to reboot onto the rescue partition. Here, they are requiring a much higher degree of informed user consent.