> This much is obvious, and it's exactly why the maintenance exists. Crashes happen; the precursors are baked right into new processes and procedures. When said

> This much is obvious, and it's exactly why the maintenance exists. Crashes happen; the precursors are baked right into new processes and procedures. When said processes pick up on similar symptoms in the future, it might be in the news for a day or two, and then it disappears because it's expected. At least on three occasions, multiple people have died or were injured because 737 NG planes developed serious cracks after exactly 8 years in service. Nothing like this is expected or considered to be normal. Therefore, when 50 planes of the same type are urgently grounded by multiple airlines in a very short period of time, it's considered to be newsworthy. > The precise problem with the MAX is that there's an entire body of knowledge around the MCAS and other automation included with the plane that was never shared, which meant that unlike metallurgical issues which in many cases are largely unforeseen, Boeing's problems here were entirely preventable. The previous metallurgical issues in 737 NG were also entirely preventable: https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2010/12/20101214104637901849.html https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2010/12/... That makes the real source of any new issues with 737 NG questionable. My point is, that MAX and MCAS is not the first instance of Boeing's negligence. And new things that went wrong with 737 NG might still be discovered.