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DNSSSEC can distribute an actual certificate pin (DANE), making the web PKI semi-obsolete, distribute a CA pin (CAA), or any other PKI data should the clients s

DNSSSEC can distribute an actual certificate pin (DANE), making the web PKI semi-obsolete, distribute a CA pin (CAA), or any other PKI data should the clients support it. I think most people agree that the domain is the trust point nowadays (as most certificates are domain validated; there is a whole industry pushing organization name validation with EV, but it has never worked well in the real world), so it makes sense to anchor the http certificate to the domain one. DANE hasn't really taken off much outside mail traffic (where it is optional but to some extent forced when present). The jury is still out on CAA. As for the rest, one can only hope for new initiatives. The open web PKI only works for the big actors.

Thorrez 7y ago
Does DNSSEC upgrade http:// http:// to https:// https:// ? If not, then it doesn't solve the specific problem Troy and I were talking about (namely MITMs snooping on http:// http:// traffic). What's the primary attack that DANE attempts to protect against? CAs issuing certs to entities they shouldn't? Troy doesn't seem to be worried about those attacks.
- xorcist 7y ago
  There are several kinds of MITM. DNSSEC makes rebinding, poisoning and DNS interception for capturing and modifying traffic neutered. Being a protocol it is however ineffective against other attacks such as unauthorized domain transfers. What artursapek describes is probably that, while you are of course correct that no improved encryption could possibly improve on the fact that web browsers still default to unencrypted communications. So the problems are mostly complementary, but rebinding and poisoning offers an attacker more ways of intercepting cleartext traffic unless mitigated.
tptacek 7y ago
The major mail providers are busy killing off DNSSEC for SMTP as well; see SMTP-STS, which has as an explicit goal defeating downgrade attacks without resorting to DNSSEC.

Thorrez 7y ago

Does DNSSEC upgrade http:// http:// to https:// https:// ? If not, then it doesn't solve the specific problem Troy and I were talking about (namely MITMs snooping on http:// http:// traffic). What's the primary attack that DANE attempts to protect against? CAs issuing certs to entities they shouldn't? Troy doesn't seem to be worried about those attacks.

xorcist 7y ago
There are several kinds of MITM. DNSSEC makes rebinding, poisoning and DNS interception for capturing and modifying traffic neutered. Being a protocol it is however ineffective against other attacks such as unauthorized domain transfers. What artursapek describes is probably that, while you are of course correct that no improved encryption could possibly improve on the fact that web browsers still default to unencrypted communications. So the problems are mostly complementary, but rebinding and poisoning offers an attacker more ways of intercepting cleartext traffic unless mitigated.

tptacek 7y ago

The major mail providers are busy killing off DNSSEC for SMTP as well; see SMTP-STS, which has as an explicit goal defeating downgrade attacks without resorting to DNSSEC.