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A pilot is qualified ("type rated") to fly planes of a given type certificate, so it's not helpful to say that type certificates are not about pilots. Having th

A pilot is qualified ("type rated") to fly planes of a given type certificate, so it's not helpful to say that type certificates are not about pilots. Having that belief causes you to miss out on fully understanding the situation. I wouldn't call this a perverse or unexpected incentive either. It's very straightforward: there is regulation saying you can't keep the same type certificate if the plane flies differently enough to demand pilot retraining. The regulation is good and the consequences of following the regulation correctly are good, unlike in actual perverse incentive situations. Boeing didn't want to comply with the regulation so they lied about how the plane worked and then hundreds of people died. That's not an example of a perverse incentive of regulation: it's an example of dishonestly evading regulation, hopefully criminally so.

loeg 7y ago
> A pilot is qualified ("type rated") to fly planes of a given type certificate, so it's not helpful to say that type certificates are not about pilots. Eh. The relationship here is between the manufacturer and the FAA. That the regulation is tangentially related to pilots is moot to the point. > It's very straightforward: there is regulation saying you can't keep the same type certificate if the plane flies differently enough to demand pilot retraining. The regulation is good I agree! > and the consequences of following the regulation correctly are good Mostly true! > Boeing didn't want to comply with the regulation This was (arguably) an outcome, but I don't believe it was the goal. I.e., Boeing would love to comply with this regulation in the magical hypothetical where it cost them nothing to do so. They're not comical villains. The problem with this simplistic summary you've provided is that qualifying a new type certificate is extremely costly. Convincing the FAA your new aircraft is actually just a modified version of an existing type certificate (whether or not that is true) is much less costly (and given how much of the 1960s airframe is still being used in the MAX to keep that type certificate, it's even plausibly reasonable to consider it like earlier extensions to the cert). So, long story short, there is a direct financial motivation for Boeing to skirt the rules and pretend new products are just another modified 737. That is exactly the perverse incentive I am highlighting. > That's not an example of a perverse incentive of regulation: it's an example of dishonestly evading regulation, hopefully criminally so. I think you mostly missed the point. Regulations with mostly good consequences can still create perverse incentives in some areas and positive incentives in others.
- goatinaboat 7y ago
  The problem with this simplistic summary you've provided is that qualifying a new type certificate is extremely costly. Yes but you're missing that there are two sets of costs: the recertification cost for Boeing, and the retraining costs for their customers, the airlines. Boeing didn't want to pay and it didn't want to tell its customers that there was this additional cost and risk losing some sales.
- cjbprime 7y ago
  Cool, I agree with most of that. It just sounds like I think Boeing has behaved closer to comical villains than you do! I don't think some jail time for executives would be an overreaction.

loeg 7y ago

> A pilot is qualified ("type rated") to fly planes of a given type certificate, so it's not helpful to say that type certificates are not about pilots. Eh. The relationship here is between the manufacturer and the FAA. That the regulation is tangentially related to pilots is moot to the point. > It's very straightforward: there is regulation saying you can't keep the same type certificate if the plane flies differently enough to demand pilot retraining. The regulation is good I agree! > and the consequences of following the regulation correctly are good Mostly true! > Boeing didn't want to comply with the regulation This was (arguably) an outcome, but I don't believe it was the goal. I.e., Boeing would love to comply with this regulation in the magical hypothetical where it cost them nothing to do so. They're not comical villains. The problem with this simplistic summary you've provided is that qualifying a new type certificate is extremely costly. Convincing the FAA your new aircraft is actually just a modified version of an existing type certificate (whether or not that is true) is much less costly (and given how much of the 1960s airframe is still being used in the MAX to keep that type certificate, it's even plausibly reasonable to consider it like earlier extensions to the cert). So, long story short, there is a direct financial motivation for Boeing to skirt the rules and pretend new products are just another modified 737. That is exactly the perverse incentive I am highlighting. > That's not an example of a perverse incentive of regulation: it's an example of dishonestly evading regulation, hopefully criminally so. I think you mostly missed the point. Regulations with mostly good consequences can still create perverse incentives in some areas and positive incentives in others.

goatinaboat 7y ago
The problem with this simplistic summary you've provided is that qualifying a new type certificate is extremely costly. Yes but you're missing that there are two sets of costs: the recertification cost for Boeing, and the retraining costs for their customers, the airlines. Boeing didn't want to pay and it didn't want to tell its customers that there was this additional cost and risk losing some sales.
cjbprime 7y ago
Cool, I agree with most of that. It just sounds like I think Boeing has behaved closer to comical villains than you do! I don't think some jail time for executives would be an overreaction.