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> > A router can't intercept anything on an encrypted connection. > MITM can listen in on (and modify) that TCP connection. Not if the connection is encrypted
by teddyh 7y ago
> > A router can't intercept anything on an encrypted connection.
> MITM can listen in on (and modify) that TCP connection.
Not if the connection is encrypted, as was stipulated.
> Another problem is I believe DNSSEC is only validated by the recursive resolver.
True, you need a trusted connection to the resolver you use (which you also have to trust). Therefore, you can either use DoT or DoH to some resolver which you have to trust, or run your own local resolver on the local machine.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- Thorrez 7y ago>Not if the connection is encrypted, as was stipulated. Hmm, yes, there does appear to be some confusion. I misread artursapek and missed the "encrypted connection" part. Assuming "encrypted connection" refers to the connection to the website, then my question is what is telling the connection to be encrypted? The article is about current non-encrypted connections. So something needs to be done to convert those http:// http:// connections into https:// https:// connections, and I don't think DNSSEC does that.
- teddyh 7y ago> So something needs to be done to convert those http:// http:// connections into https:// https:// connections, and I don't think DNSSEC does that. HSTS is already being used for this, although it uses a TOFU-like model where the very first connection is vulnerable to MITM downgrade. DANE (which uses DNSSEC) does not have this problem, and could be used for this, but it’s the browser vendors who would have to be convinced to implement it, and I don’t have high hopes.
- tptacek 7y agoDANE does in practice have this problem; see the chain-extension fiasco. A lot of these things look like they work until you actually try to get a browser to do them.
- teddyh 7y agoI can’t seem to find what you are referring to. Could you specify what the problem is?
- tptacek 7y agoFrom memory, but you can just look it up: DANE is untenable in browsers because (1) it's much too slow and (2) a lot of networks won't pass DANE lookups; if your HTTPS connection relies on DNSSEC/DANE "just working", the web breaks for those people. So instead, you staple DANE records to the TLS handshake with an extension. But that's incoherent: the purpose of DANE is to establish a root of trust for TLS connections, but the extensions carried in a TLS handshake depend on a root of trust. In practice, if you can get an X.509 certificate issued, you can strip stapled DANE records. So there's no point to stapling DANE records. Solution: dynamic pinning and continuity over multiple connections.
- teddyh 7y ago> DANE is untenable in browsers because Neither of those things make sense to me: > (1) it's much too slow Browsers already do A/AAAA DNS lookups, which presumably does not present any huge latency issue. If latency would be a problem, DNS servers could send the additional DANE records in the “additional” section, just like they do now with an A or AAAA query leading to a CNAME record; this would completely eliminate any additional latency with DANE. > and (2) a lot of networks won't pass DANE lookups I don’t think so; if that were the case, DANE would not be rolled out as widely as it is for SMTP.
- tptacek 7y agoI'm not making either of those up; you can find them at the top of the chain-extensions draft, which is a collaboration between Mozilla and DNSSEC people. Both are also in Adam Langley's "Why Not DANE In Browsers" post. I'm pretty confident these are real issues, and not really a productive live debate for HN.