4 ms·
I think the key thing is how the MCAS added new failure modes that the pilots where not briefed about. There should be way more strict user interface requireme
by phicoh 7y ago
I think the key thing is how the MCAS added new failure modes that the pilots where not briefed about.
There should be way more strict user interface requirements. Including how humans are supposed to react to failures and whether that makes sense from human psychology point of view
If the MCAS had informed pilots of a potential sensor failure, then there would have been a very good chance that the pilots would have been able to land the planes safely.
- linuxftw 7y ago> If the MCAS had informed pilots of a potential sensor failure, then there would have been a very good chance that the pilots would have been able to land the planes safely. Perhaps on the two crashes. We don't have any data on successful landings with MCAS disabled in very adverse flying conditions. What if the plane is unsafe to fly without proper MCAS operation? There should be a test that results in a plane crash with 50% of the simulations with MCAS behaving properly (IE, extreme weather, low fuel, land or die). Now during that same simulation, disable MCAS randomly. Also, there seems to be potential for the MCAS to come in and out based on disagreement (loose sensor wiring, etc), and see what the crash rate is for intermittent MCAS failures. It's clear Boeing didn't do any of this kind of testing because they would have easily caught the failure modes that caused the plane to nose-dive into the ground. Completely predictable based on the behavior of the system.