Mr. Snowden is right. If you don't start with the assumption that ALL SECRETS LEAK SOONER OR LATER, your information security plan is definitely flawed. Not ev

Mr. Snowden is right. If you don't start with the assumption that ALL SECRETS LEAK SOONER OR LATER, your information security plan is definitely flawed. Not even state actors with unlimited resources (that's you, NSA) can prevent stored secrets from leaking. It's ALWAYS something, whether teenaged hackers or far-flung contract system administrators with too much access (that's you, Mr. Snowden). Rule 1. Don't collect data you don't need. Rule 2. Don't store data you don't need. Rule 3. Assume all data you store will leak, according to Murphy's law (at the worst possible time). Rule 4. Make your stored data has limited utility. Eternal Blue (hi again NSA) was not such a secret. Rule 5. Make sure your stored data has limited useful lifetime. US Social Security numbers do not have limited useful lifetime. Strangely enough, credit card numbers do have limited lifetime. Rule 6. Do your best to set up leak detection. For example, seed your financial secret caches with fake social security numbers that raise flags when used. Rule 7. See rule 3. Secrets should be stored under the legal concept of strict liability. They're just like bulls in a farmer's field. If the bull escapes and causes damage, the farmer pays for it. No excuses. No need to prove negligence. We have, up and running at scale, workers' compensation and the vaccine injury fund. Both of those assume strict liability. A dangerous factory sees its premiums go high enough to put it out of business. Same for a sloppy vaccine manufacturer. Why can't NSA and Equifax be held to the same standard? (I'd hate to be POTUS announcing a tax increase to cover the damage caused by Eternal Blue.)