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Does such approach as desribed by you mean that token needs to store P1/K1 for every site? AFAIK It does not. And if it does not, your explanation contains bi
by rdslw 7y ago
Does such approach as desribed by you mean that token needs to store P1/K1 for every site?
AFAIK It does not.
And if it does not, your explanation contains bigger errors about enrollment/process.
@akrel described it much better.
- tialaramex 7y agoIn my description I specifically explain that the token gets P1 back by decrypting C1 with S so that it needn't be stored. You've become fixated on the part akerl_ (not @akrel) got right, that tokens don't store the private key but missed the _essential_ element they got wrong which is how this key is generated. One really obvious consequence of things working as I explained rather than as akerl_ (presumably mistakenly not maliciously) explained is what happens if we do enrollment again with the same token for the same Relying Party, for example maybe Alice and Bob are a couple sharing a token. In reality, as in my explanation, these enrollments produce completely different results, the token will pick a random P1 (thus K1, C1, etc.) when Alice enrolls and a different random P2 (thus K2, C2, etc.) when Bob enrolls, and for the Relying Party everything is different between these two enrollments, just as if the token was different. In akerl_'s description Alice and Bob would get the same application ID, same results, and now a Relying Party can tell that Alice and Bob are using the same token.