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> I think the VPN vs DoH argument is a fallacy. You could argue the same way for things like telnet vs ssh and it would make just as little sense. I do not see
by throw0101a 7y ago
> I think the VPN vs DoH argument is a fallacy. You could argue the same way for things like telnet vs ssh and it would make just as little sense.
I do not see how the two are equivalent.
DoH does not help you at at all if your browser is going to go to an IP that is on a watchlist. That is the author's (and Paul Vixie's point).
HTTPS does protect exact content (like SSH), but the fact that you are going to (say) wikipedia.org, eff.org, or torproject.org, is much more difficult to hide because at the end of the day, if you're not using VPN, the network operator can see where your Layer 3 addresses are going to and can make inferences about your actions. And in some places inferences are 'good enough' to get you in trouble, or at least flagged for further monitoring.
> DoH is also not meant to "hide" what you're doing as much as it is about enabling you to protect your DNS queries from manipulation.
Technically speaking, if you're not getting DNSSEC signed results back, you're also trusting your DoH provider to not manipulate records. ;)
- karasu 7y ago> DoH does not help you at at all if your browser is going to go to an IP that is on a watchlist. That is the author's (and Paul Vixie's point). If that's the aim then I have to concur that DoH does nothing here. This is why I dislike the way Mozilla touts DoH as a privacy feature, because that's not what it (primarily) should be about, as far as I'm concerned. > Technically speaking, if you're not getting DNSSEC signed results back, you're also trusting your DoH provider to not manipulate records. ;) Agreed. But that's exactly why you can pick a trusted resolver, right? One that you trust to correctly validate DNSSEC for you, so you simply trust the AD bit in the response instead of doing all this on each and every client. And one that you trust not to mess with answers in general. Without either DoT or DoH, you are basically forced to validate DNSSEC on every Client, which seems like a waste.
- throw0101a 7y ago> Without either DoT or DoH, you are basically forced to validate DNSSEC on every Client, which seems like a waste. Part of Vixie's talk was about the changing nature/position of the recursive resolver: when he started DNS stuff in 1988, it was often the case that there was a resolver right on the subnet that you were on, often living on the default gateway. As time has gone on, it started moving "up" closer to the cloud (as we now call it): to being building-wide, then to the campus, and now generally the ISP. (Though local CPE routers have a caching resolver nowadays, they often go to the ISP's service.) Now we're talking about having DNS 'in the cloud' (i.e., Internet) from some distant provider, often close (network/latency-wise) to the service that we will eventually connecting to once we get the look-up from.
- pas 7y agoMozilla cares about HTTP security first and foremost, as they are a browser vendor. And TLS with ESNI takes care of that. But it punts the problem at DNS. And DoH solves that. And 99% of interesting traffic is over HTTP. For email there's MTA-STS (basically HSTS for SMTP), for everything else... um, what's left actually? (P2P networks, but for that VPN is recommended anyway.) Sure, inference from L3 data is still possible. But there's a big difference between looking at just "tumblr", "wordpress", "blogspot", or knowing that you look at which blogs.