3 ms·

The flip side is that on a local level (your own network) you want to be able to block all sorts of traffic for entirely good reasons.

• Ajedi32 7y ago
  The problem is that it's not realistic to expect client machines to be able to distinguish between blocking for "good reasons" or "bad reasons". The network isn't (usually) under the user's control, and as a result any reasonable threat model for software running on client machines should assume the network is actively malicious. Ultimately, I think any sort of content blocking is going to have to happen on client machines. Or at least via a mechanism which depends the client machine's active cooperation. Anything less just opens users up to interference from malicious third parties.
  • cbzbc 7y ago
    On the flip side; the client device is increasingly outside the control of the user (phones, smart speakers, TVs etc). So there's the question of how a user protects themselves against a device that may be actively or incidentally malicious. > The network isn't (usually) under the user's control, and as a result any reasonable threat model for software running on client machines should assume the network is actively malicious. Yes, but there is nothing about DoH that solves this in any way.
  • zzzcpan 7y ago
    Network is under user control, pretty much all devices require active cooperation to connect device's internal network to any external network, it doesn't happen on its own.