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The big difference is ease of use. You can basically round the number of people using email encryption to zero. Additionally, email encryption is fraught with o

by likpok 7y ago

The big difference is ease of use. You can basically round the number of people using email encryption to zero. Additionally, email encryption is fraught with operational issues making it easy to screw up. On the other hand, a billion people use WhatsApp and don’t think about it. That’s a big shift in who uses encryption and how easy it is to passively surveil them.

nine_k 7y ago
Email may be a particularly poor example. Any half-serious operation would likely just order a custom encryption app, anonymously, paid for by monero, or something. What really is important is reliability. An open source app, checked by experts, buildable from scratch in a controlled environment, is much less likely to have a bug planted by a three-letter agency. So yes, good and widespread end-to-end encryption is a large nuisance for said agencies, even if a successful ban on it does not prevent criminals from encrypted communication in principle.
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deogeo 7y ago
I'd argue that despite encryption, the big shift in surveillance is how easy it's becoming. Message content may be somewhat safe (assuming neither endpoint was compromised, which has gotten easier than ever to do. Just plant a bug, or point a camera at your target while they type in their password), but metadata is as vulnerable and valuable as ever. As is tracking massive numbers of people through cell-phones, facial recognition, omnipresent cameras, surveillance drones that can remain airborne for days and cover whole cities... I could go on.
stiray 7y ago
Yes, that is exactly my point. e2e war has nothing to do with actual "threats" that are beeing sold to us as they are and will (even more after all public debates) encrypt their data. Even local potheads that I know are using pgp. The whole sharade has nothing to do with threats, it is about monitoring everyone (HK scenario comes to my mind), it is not "war against terror", it is war against public.

by likpok 7y ago

nine_k 7y ago

Email may be a particularly poor example. Any half-serious operation would likely just order a custom encryption app, anonymously, paid for by monero, or something. What really is important is reliability. An open source app, checked by experts, buildable from scratch in a controlled environment, is much less likely to have a bug planted by a three-letter agency. So yes, good and widespread end-to-end encryption is a large nuisance for said agencies, even if a successful ban on it does not prevent criminals from encrypted communication in principle.

deleted 7y ago
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deogeo 7y ago

I'd argue that despite encryption, the big shift in surveillance is how easy it's becoming. Message content may be somewhat safe (assuming neither endpoint was compromised, which has gotten easier than ever to do. Just plant a bug, or point a camera at your target while they type in their password), but metadata is as vulnerable and valuable as ever. As is tracking massive numbers of people through cell-phones, facial recognition, omnipresent cameras, surveillance drones that can remain airborne for days and cover whole cities... I could go on.

stiray 7y ago

Yes, that is exactly my point. e2e war has nothing to do with actual "threats" that are beeing sold to us as they are and will (even more after all public debates) encrypt their data. Even local potheads that I know are using pgp. The whole sharade has nothing to do with threats, it is about monitoring everyone (HK scenario comes to my mind), it is not "war against terror", it is war against public.