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Trying to circumvent tracking at the browser level is hopeless. The only effective approaches that I know of are 1) using Whonix (best in Qubes) to connect via

Trying to circumvent tracking at the browser level is hopeless. The only effective approaches that I know of are 1) using Whonix (best in Qubes) to connect via Tor; and 2) using multiple OS-level VMs that connect via different nested VPN chains. And even then, there are risks from fingerprints that depend on GPU and virtual graphics drivers in VMs. So when compartmentalization really matters, it's necessary to use different host machines, on different LANs (or at least vLANs). Using Tor is rather painful, given all the CAPTCHAs. And the learning curve for Qubes is a little steep. But using multiple VMs with different nested VPN chains is actually quite convenient, once you've set it up. I use a pfSense VM as the gateway router for each VPN service. So creating nested VPN chains is easy: You just create virtual networks of the pfSense VMs, with Linux workspace VMs wherever you like. With a decent host machine, I can work ~seamlessly as a few low-isolation personas via nested VPN chains, and another few high-isolation personas via nested VPN chains and Whonix instances.

bo1024 7y ago
Not sure about the priorities here. Fingerprinting should be the main concern, so steps 1,2,3 are obscuring IP address and disabling cookies and JavaScript. Even beyond that, not sure how chaining VMs etc helps much more than a single VPN. Although an ideal solution would spin up a random VM, browser, screen size, and tor connection for each new web page visited...
- mirimir 7y ago
  > an ideal solution would spin up a random VM, browser, screen size, and tor connection for each new web page visited... Sure. I wouldn't limit it to Tor, though. Because there are just too many CAPTCHAs. That's much less of an issue using VPNs. Chaining VPNs is arguably overkill for avoiding fingerprinting. Still, trusting a single VPN service is risky. If they were complicit, you'd still be tracked. But if you at least chain two VPN services, there's less risk. Overall risk is more or less the product of all the individual risks, if they're independent. Edit: If exploit resistance is less of an issue, it's easy to chain VPNs at the Linux OS level using ip route and iptables. Iptables rules drop everything on enp0s3 except traffic to the first VPN server, and drop everything on tun0 except traffic to the second VPN server. You set enp0s3 as the route for the first VPN server. After connecting to it, you set tun0 as the route for the second VPN server. After connecting to it, you check for leaks using tcpdump.
  - pmoriarty 7y ago
    How do you pay for your VPNs in a non-trackable way? If you pay via credit card, the VPN account has your name attached to it, no? So what good will chaining VPNs do when all the VPNs have your name attached to them? Bitcoin is also supposedly not anonymous (or so I've heard.. I really don't know much about bitcoin, so please correct me if I'm wrong here), so paying with it sounds like it won't be any better. Also, I have to ask: Who are you trying to prevent being tracked by? If it's by advertisers, I don't see how chaning VPNs would be any better than using a single VPN.
    - mirimir 7y ago
      I'd prefer to be tracked by nothing. Or at least, by nothing short of a targeted TLA attack. And yes, Bitcoin is not anonymous. Just the opposite, in fact. Some cryptocurrencies arguably are anonymous. But that's never really been tested, and in any case, they're not widely accepted. Any VPN service that I connect to directly, I pay with credit cards. Because there's ~zero anonymity for them, no matter what. But for the rest, I pay with well-mixed Bitcoin. I anonymize Bitcoin using wallets in a series of Whonix instances, via Tor. Using a different mixing service for each step. With N steps, I have somewhere between N/3 and N-1 ~anonymous Bitcoin pools. Depending on how many mixes I consider adequate. So then I select Bitcoin pools for paying VPN services in proportion to the degree of separation.
    - dashwav 7y ago
      I have been using Mullvad[1] for a year or so now and am really happy with the extent they go to avoid storing payment information. One of the things that caught my eye about them initially is that you could literally mail them an envelop containing your account number and $5 cash and they will add that time to your account, which seems to solve what it was you were asking about (although I am sure physically mailing something comes with it's own issues of privacy). [1]https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/ https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/
      - mirimir 7y ago
        Yeah, love Mullvad. They've been around for about a decade. Along with AirVPN, Insorg and IVPN. IVPN may still accept cash as well.
briandear 7y ago
> So when compartmentalization really matters Just curious, for most normal people, when does compartmentalization really matter?
- mirimir 7y ago
  When getting pwned is an existential threat. If you define "normal people" to exclude those who take existential risks, then compartmentalization never really matters for them. But that's a sad way to live, in my opinion. Compartmentalization would have mattered a lot for Chelsea Manning. Or, arguably, for Julian Assange. Or for various public figures whose careers have been destroyed after pwnage. Or for DPR.

bo1024 7y ago

Not sure about the priorities here. Fingerprinting should be the main concern, so steps 1,2,3 are obscuring IP address and disabling cookies and JavaScript. Even beyond that, not sure how chaining VMs etc helps much more than a single VPN. Although an ideal solution would spin up a random VM, browser, screen size, and tor connection for each new web page visited...

mirimir 7y ago
> an ideal solution would spin up a random VM, browser, screen size, and tor connection for each new web page visited... Sure. I wouldn't limit it to Tor, though. Because there are just too many CAPTCHAs. That's much less of an issue using VPNs. Chaining VPNs is arguably overkill for avoiding fingerprinting. Still, trusting a single VPN service is risky. If they were complicit, you'd still be tracked. But if you at least chain two VPN services, there's less risk. Overall risk is more or less the product of all the individual risks, if they're independent. Edit: If exploit resistance is less of an issue, it's easy to chain VPNs at the Linux OS level using ip route and iptables. Iptables rules drop everything on enp0s3 except traffic to the first VPN server, and drop everything on tun0 except traffic to the second VPN server. You set enp0s3 as the route for the first VPN server. After connecting to it, you set tun0 as the route for the second VPN server. After connecting to it, you check for leaks using tcpdump.
- pmoriarty 7y ago
  How do you pay for your VPNs in a non-trackable way? If you pay via credit card, the VPN account has your name attached to it, no? So what good will chaining VPNs do when all the VPNs have your name attached to them? Bitcoin is also supposedly not anonymous (or so I've heard.. I really don't know much about bitcoin, so please correct me if I'm wrong here), so paying with it sounds like it won't be any better. Also, I have to ask: Who are you trying to prevent being tracked by? If it's by advertisers, I don't see how chaning VPNs would be any better than using a single VPN.
  - mirimir 7y ago
    I'd prefer to be tracked by nothing. Or at least, by nothing short of a targeted TLA attack. And yes, Bitcoin is not anonymous. Just the opposite, in fact. Some cryptocurrencies arguably are anonymous. But that's never really been tested, and in any case, they're not widely accepted. Any VPN service that I connect to directly, I pay with credit cards. Because there's ~zero anonymity for them, no matter what. But for the rest, I pay with well-mixed Bitcoin. I anonymize Bitcoin using wallets in a series of Whonix instances, via Tor. Using a different mixing service for each step. With N steps, I have somewhere between N/3 and N-1 ~anonymous Bitcoin pools. Depending on how many mixes I consider adequate. So then I select Bitcoin pools for paying VPN services in proportion to the degree of separation.
  - dashwav 7y ago
    I have been using Mullvad[1] for a year or so now and am really happy with the extent they go to avoid storing payment information. One of the things that caught my eye about them initially is that you could literally mail them an envelop containing your account number and $5 cash and they will add that time to your account, which seems to solve what it was you were asking about (although I am sure physically mailing something comes with it's own issues of privacy). [1]https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/ https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/
    - mirimir 7y ago
      Yeah, love Mullvad. They've been around for about a decade. Along with AirVPN, Insorg and IVPN. IVPN may still accept cash as well.

briandear 7y ago

> So when compartmentalization really matters Just curious, for most normal people, when does compartmentalization really matter?

mirimir 7y ago
When getting pwned is an existential threat. If you define "normal people" to exclude those who take existential risks, then compartmentalization never really matters for them. But that's a sad way to live, in my opinion. Compartmentalization would have mattered a lot for Chelsea Manning. Or, arguably, for Julian Assange. Or for various public figures whose careers have been destroyed after pwnage. Or for DPR.