> Firewalling access points, good practice or not, should not be necessary. It is now, it seems. Having seen what kinds of data crash reports in other domains

> Firewalling access points, good practice or not, should not be necessary. It is now, it seems. Having seen what kinds of data crash reports in other domains include (the richer the call chain trace, the better) I expect this to be a subtle security problem. In regulated or otherwise highish-security networks one can expect to see user authentication when accessing wifi (EAP). Simple scenario: AP crashes during client auth stage. A full crash trace may easily contain the credentials used for EAP, and if those are sent to mothership, your access point has just leaked out the necessary information to successfully access your secure network. Worse, when EAP is used, the login is likely bound to domain credentials, which are practically guaranteed to allow access to all sorts of internal services. To state the obvious: best practice with crash traces is to filter out or mask high-value KV pairs. But then again, best practices also disallow leaking credentials in the first place. For my part, I will now consider Unifi APs as rogue devices.