3 ms·
"There's no reason for four diesel generators when two would do" I remember one senior Scottish Nuclear bloke telling me about one, rather important, bit of eq
by arethuza 16y ago
"There's no reason for four diesel generators when two would do"
I remember one senior Scottish Nuclear bloke telling me about one, rather important, bit of equipment at Hunterston B plant (another AGR site on the west coast of Scotland) - the Reactor Shutdown Safety Sequencing Equipment (RSSSE) (not my recall of the details of this acronym are probably a bit off). This shuts down the plant in a safe way if something were to go badly wrong.
Apparently when the AGRs were being designed in the 60s/70s they, understandably, to use tried and tested technology for this module. However, what tried and tested meant to these engineers was that stuff should have had multiple decades of production use before they would consider it - so the technology in the RSSSE was essentially from the 1940s - worm gears, relays etc. At the time I was working on research projects that involved Scottish Nuclear (the early 1990s) they were rather proud of the fact that there was no safety critical software in any AGR plant (there were plenty safety related systems).
So I think it's safe to say that the designs of these plants were, when it came to safety, quite conservative - even if the overall design goals of the plants were actually quite ambitious. As Charlie says, the abiding impression I got of the design of the AGRs (and I am no nuclear engineers) is that they had a design decision that would impact safety they always played safe - massive redundancy in systems, a vast amount of instrumentation (my estimate of the number of signals fed into the control room was off by a comical factor) etc.
We have in Scotland an excellent example of what could be called "conspicuous over engineering" - the Forth Rail Bridge - which was designed in the aftermath of a rail disaster where a bridge over the Firth of Tay collapsed with a train on it, causing great loss of life. With the Forth Rail Bridge not only is it a fantastic bit of engineering the whole spirit of the thing asserts "this is safe".
To me, my experience with the people of Scottish Nuclear and the design of the AGRs themselves gave me a huge amount of confidence that not only were the designs probably as safe as they could be but they were operated in a way that was quite amazingly safety conscious. Given that the UK is rather small and very crowded - with the Central Belt of Scotland being particularly densely populated and neatly bracketed by AGR plants at Hunterston in the west and Torness in the East I'm actually rather pleased that these systems were also conspicuously over engineered.
- jacquesm 16y agoThey could have used some more of that at Windscale.
- arethuza 16y agoActually, I did wonder whether there might have been a backlash against the crazy under-engineered Windscale air cooled reactors and the near disaster of the reactor fire there: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windscale_fire http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windscale_fire So Windscale might have been the Tay Bridge to the Forth Bridge of the AGRs. [Edit: The description of the fire in that Wikipedia page is pretty alarming - fancy sticking a scaffolding pole into an on-fire nuclear reactor and bringing it out dripping in liquid irradiated uranium!]