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The part I find a bit weak is the discussion of RFC3820 proxy certs, which I remember from the grid-computing days. They were originally designed in the differe
by saltcured 7y ago
The part I find a bit weak is the discussion of RFC3820 proxy certs, which I remember from the grid-computing days. They were originally designed in the different era of the late 1990s, but I would be interested to read a more in-depth comparison of the approaches.
Those proxy credentials were primarily for delegating "limited" client/user credentials, which in turn might be used as either the client or server role for subsequent TLS connections during the lifecycle of a distributed, scientific computing job. As I recall, the practical "limited" characteristic in the Globus GSI system was a single bit flag that was interpreted in the ecosystem to prevent recursive delegation, i.e. out of an abundance of caution about things like batch jobs turning into worms.
- sudoyear123 7y agoThis is a very good question. We actually did consider proxy certs and name constraints certs first and had a long discussion at the IETF about these different options. At the end the consensus was that it would be much better to have a very minimal structure which could only do 1 thing and nothing else. DCs also have the advantage that they are cryptographically bound to a particular End entity certificate vs a particular public key only, and hence can only be used with their properties, so it really is the minimal possible thing you need and nothing more.