> Cast in this manner, the nothing to hide argument is a formidable one. No. It's still the same old weak argument. "This surveillance will never be used for

> Cast in this manner, the nothing to hide argument is a formidable one. No. It's still the same old weak argument. "This surveillance will never be used for the wrong reasons and any level of incidental damage to innocents is acceptable, as long as we achieve our goal of preventing people from doing a narrow definition of the wrong thing." The flaws are this. (1) not only is there no definition of "the wrong reasons" ("only those who are engaged in illegal activities"), the definition can change, and experience has show that such surveillance data inevitably gets used for purposes outside of the original limited intent. Such primises are not worth the water in which they are writ. (2) The only acceptable level of incidental damage to innocent parties is zero. (3) Surveillance is often a form of terrorism. It's a well-documented historic fact (thanks, Stazi, for you predilection for recordkeeping). Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?