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That's the thing, there is NO transition point. There's just two of you. SO, if there are two of your consciousness with the same thoughts, experiences, and the

That's the thing, there is NO transition point. There's just two of you. SO, if there are two of your consciousness with the same thoughts, experiences, and the whole shabang up until the second one is made and the first dies, does it even matter that it's not the original? I would argue no. Because for you, your consciousness, it's as if you are still the same person. The first doesn't matter, because it's just turned off. But you still exist. Unless you're arguing for a 'soul', there is no difference between the two consciousnesses. Therefore, you are still alive.

kaibee 7y ago
> That's the thing, there is NO transition point. There's just two of you. SO, if there are two of your consciousness with the same thoughts, experiences, and the whole shabang up until the second one is made and the first dies, does it even matter that it's not the original? Externally, no. But it matters to me, the original. > I would argue no. Because for you, your consciousness, it's as if you are still the same person. Yes, for the copy, it is as if they are the original. > The first doesn't matter, because it's just turned off. What if the copy is made non-destructively? > But you still exist. A version of you still exists. > Unless you're arguing for a 'soul', there is no difference between the two consciousnesses. Therefore, you are still alive. The causal chain of events matters. If a copy of your consciousness is made, it can be done without you ever knowing about it.
scarejunba 7y ago
There is no “your consciousness” as an identity across the two copies. So you fork a process and you kill one of the processes. That process experiences death. Likewise one copy experiences death. Does it matter? Depending on your objectives. If it’s to achieve some sort of world domination through pseudo-immortality, probably not, since your copy will execute faithfully as you. But your perception, the body unit you’re in, will most definitely see an end. It won’t ‘jump’ into the other medium. This you will die. That you will live.
mellosouls 7y ago
crossposted / post-posted with several others :) There is a transition point - at least for b. a gets to the transition point and dies. b "awakes" with a's memories. So: you are a ... > [transition] ... you are ? How do you know you (formerly a) become b at that point? Certainly from b's perspective that is the case - but from former a's perspective? Which do you "switch to"? Death or b? You need to consider 3 perspectives: a then after the transition: b (live a) c (dead a) If you don't want to consider dead a, then consider this: what if the experiment went wrong? a isn't killed in the process, but a copy of their consciousness is loaded into b. Same situation as before, but both a and b think they are former a. Which are you (formerly a) in that circumstance? Why? I would argue a has a strong case to be considered the correct version - which means you die in the first case.
jodrellblank 7y ago
So let's assume that the universe is infinite in extent, and everything which can happen, does happen, infinite times. That means you are not the only "you" in the Universe. You may now commit suicide, safe in the knowledge that it doesn't matter, because there's no difference between the current you and the distant you. Unless you're now going to change tack and say it only counts if you're in each other's Light cone, and have seen each other, and understand the cloning machine's workings, and trust it was built correctly, and an endless amount of other procrastinating which proves that it does matter to you which one dies, and no matter what words you type, your behavior will show that you recognize a stark difference between "you" and "someone else". Clearly a condition "I know they exist" doesn't change whether you two are the same person or not, so that can't be an important part of it.
- AgentME 7y ago
  >You may now commit suicide, safe in the knowledge that it doesn't matter, because there's no difference between the current you and the distant you. If you decide to commit suicide, then any identical copies of yourself will also have the same thought process and decide to commit suicide too, so you'll have killed all identical copies of yourself. That's very different than deciding to do something (like use a scan-clone-destroy teleporter) that will create a copy of yourself and then destroy one copy of yourself.
  - jodrellblank 7y ago
    Then make it Russian Roulette; most of you will survive, and any one of you is enough to count as all of you. Now is it any different to stepping into the teleporter?
    - AgentME 7y ago
      Playing russian roulette would leave many worlds without an instance of me, in a way that the teleporter wouldn't. I care about my responsibilities and loved ones left without me in those worlds. If there were truly infinite worlds and infinite of each variation, and you could somehow play russian roulette instead with an entire world, so that each one has a risk of just entirely blinking out of existence ... it feels superficially wrong, but I find it hard to argue against. I'd worry that there's a risk of if it was done infinitely, then by some logic the infinite sum could eventually lead to all worlds not existing eventually, but if that was definitely known not to be a risk then I would find it hard to care about whether the world played russian roulette or not.
UnFleshedOne 7y ago
This assumes a non-destructive copying process _and_ a mandatory destruction of original. Those two things might not be easy to reconcile. A destructive copy is strictly more feasible (as far as such things are feasible at all). But it comes with a possibility to print copies once the reading is done. Then you can get multiple clones made and they will be you, but will start diverge from each other right away due to slightly different experiences.

kaibee 7y ago

> That's the thing, there is NO transition point. There's just two of you. SO, if there are two of your consciousness with the same thoughts, experiences, and the whole shabang up until the second one is made and the first dies, does it even matter that it's not the original? Externally, no. But it matters to me, the original. > I would argue no. Because for you, your consciousness, it's as if you are still the same person. Yes, for the copy, it is as if they are the original. > The first doesn't matter, because it's just turned off. What if the copy is made non-destructively? > But you still exist. A version of you still exists. > Unless you're arguing for a 'soul', there is no difference between the two consciousnesses. Therefore, you are still alive. The causal chain of events matters. If a copy of your consciousness is made, it can be done without you ever knowing about it.

scarejunba 7y ago

There is no “your consciousness” as an identity across the two copies. So you fork a process and you kill one of the processes. That process experiences death. Likewise one copy experiences death. Does it matter? Depending on your objectives. If it’s to achieve some sort of world domination through pseudo-immortality, probably not, since your copy will execute faithfully as you. But your perception, the body unit you’re in, will most definitely see an end. It won’t ‘jump’ into the other medium. This you will die. That you will live.

mellosouls 7y ago

crossposted / post-posted with several others :) There is a transition point - at least for b. a gets to the transition point and dies. b "awakes" with a's memories. So: you are a ... > [transition] ... you are ? How do you know you (formerly a) become b at that point? Certainly from b's perspective that is the case - but from former a's perspective? Which do you "switch to"? Death or b? You need to consider 3 perspectives: a then after the transition: b (live a) c (dead a) If you don't want to consider dead a, then consider this: what if the experiment went wrong? a isn't killed in the process, but a copy of their consciousness is loaded into b. Same situation as before, but both a and b think they are former a. Which are you (formerly a) in that circumstance? Why? I would argue a has a strong case to be considered the correct version - which means you die in the first case.

jodrellblank 7y ago

So let's assume that the universe is infinite in extent, and everything which can happen, does happen, infinite times. That means you are not the only "you" in the Universe. You may now commit suicide, safe in the knowledge that it doesn't matter, because there's no difference between the current you and the distant you. Unless you're now going to change tack and say it only counts if you're in each other's Light cone, and have seen each other, and understand the cloning machine's workings, and trust it was built correctly, and an endless amount of other procrastinating which proves that it does matter to you which one dies, and no matter what words you type, your behavior will show that you recognize a stark difference between "you" and "someone else". Clearly a condition "I know they exist" doesn't change whether you two are the same person or not, so that can't be an important part of it.

AgentME 7y ago
>You may now commit suicide, safe in the knowledge that it doesn't matter, because there's no difference between the current you and the distant you. If you decide to commit suicide, then any identical copies of yourself will also have the same thought process and decide to commit suicide too, so you'll have killed all identical copies of yourself. That's very different than deciding to do something (like use a scan-clone-destroy teleporter) that will create a copy of yourself and then destroy one copy of yourself.
- jodrellblank 7y ago
  Then make it Russian Roulette; most of you will survive, and any one of you is enough to count as all of you. Now is it any different to stepping into the teleporter?
  - AgentME 7y ago
    Playing russian roulette would leave many worlds without an instance of me, in a way that the teleporter wouldn't. I care about my responsibilities and loved ones left without me in those worlds. If there were truly infinite worlds and infinite of each variation, and you could somehow play russian roulette instead with an entire world, so that each one has a risk of just entirely blinking out of existence ... it feels superficially wrong, but I find it hard to argue against. I'd worry that there's a risk of if it was done infinitely, then by some logic the infinite sum could eventually lead to all worlds not existing eventually, but if that was definitely known not to be a risk then I would find it hard to care about whether the world played russian roulette or not.

UnFleshedOne 7y ago

This assumes a non-destructive copying process _and_ a mandatory destruction of original. Those two things might not be easy to reconcile. A destructive copy is strictly more feasible (as far as such things are feasible at all). But it comes with a possibility to print copies once the reading is done. Then you can get multiple clones made and they will be you, but will start diverge from each other right away due to slightly different experiences.