3 ms·
That is not true. See work by Andrew Neff on verifiable shuffles of secrets. It is practical to produce a proof that can be verified by the voter but not useful
by Canada 7y ago
That is not true. See work by Andrew Neff on verifiable shuffles of secrets. It is practical to produce a proof that can be verified by the voter but not useful in proving which way the ballot has been cast to anyone else.
- ac29 7y agoI skimmed through the paper here (http://web.cs.elte.hu/~rfid/p116-neff.pdf http://web.cs.elte.hu/~rfid/p116-neff.pdf) and it doesn't appear to solve the problem. Any time you can see your vote, so can anyone looking over your shoulder. The described method seems to prevent voting authorities from seeing specific voter's votes, which is useful, but it doesn't solve the "show me you voted for X, or I break your legs" problem.
- Canada 7y agoYeah it makes the use of electronic voting less vulnerable to tampering, but obviously the voting still needs to he done in a private booth.