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If you can verify your own vote, you can be forced to divulge that information. There's no technical solution to this problem.
by creato 7y ago
If you can verify your own vote, you can be forced to divulge that information. There's no technical solution to this problem.
- Canada 7y agoThat is not true. See work by Andrew Neff on verifiable shuffles of secrets. It is practical to produce a proof that can be verified by the voter but not useful in proving which way the ballot has been cast to anyone else.
- ac29 7y agoI skimmed through the paper here (http://web.cs.elte.hu/~rfid/p116-neff.pdf http://web.cs.elte.hu/~rfid/p116-neff.pdf) and it doesn't appear to solve the problem. Any time you can see your vote, so can anyone looking over your shoulder. The described method seems to prevent voting authorities from seeing specific voter's votes, which is useful, but it doesn't solve the "show me you voted for X, or I break your legs" problem.
- Canada 7y agoYeah it makes the use of electronic voting less vulnerable to tampering, but obviously the voting still needs to he done in a private booth.
- aeternum 7y agoThere is a simple solution: generate a random public key as part of the voting process and print it out for later verification but also include plenty of other people's public keys in the printout. The voter can remember the position of their own key if they choose to for later validation against the open ledger and can use the others for deniability (if needed).