6 ms·
Seems like a verifiable, open voting ledger is a lot more transparent and obvious, regardless of the code and method of vote collection, which are orthogonal is
by vearwhershuh 7y ago
Seems like a verifiable, open voting ledger is a lot more transparent and obvious, regardless of the code and method of vote collection, which are orthogonal issues. No reason you couldn't use paper inputs and an ID into a public ledger. In fact, it should be much more consistent.
But a simple search on the internet shows that there are a lot of folks who don't want something like this.
- Canada 7y agoWell, I'm the head of this family and this family supports the republicrats, so I'm going to be looking at your phone honey, to make sure you don't make a mistake. Or, I'm offering $10 to you, junkie, to support my party. But if you want to be paid I'm going to use your device/private key/one time code to do it myself. Or maybe you're my employee and we'll have a voting party where I can see you all wisely agree with me. The privacy of a voting booth where neutral officials who are supervised by all candidates doesn't allow either of these scenarios work.
- vearwhershuh 7y agocouldn't they issue you a secure private key when you vote?
- Canada 7y agoI can simply demand your private key in exchange for a reward or avoidance of punishment. "Hand me your phone and I will cast this vote"
- creato 7y agoIf you can verify your own vote, you can be forced to divulge that information. There's no technical solution to this problem.
- Canada 7y agoThat is not true. See work by Andrew Neff on verifiable shuffles of secrets. It is practical to produce a proof that can be verified by the voter but not useful in proving which way the ballot has been cast to anyone else.
- ac29 7y agoI skimmed through the paper here (http://web.cs.elte.hu/~rfid/p116-neff.pdf http://web.cs.elte.hu/~rfid/p116-neff.pdf) and it doesn't appear to solve the problem. Any time you can see your vote, so can anyone looking over your shoulder. The described method seems to prevent voting authorities from seeing specific voter's votes, which is useful, but it doesn't solve the "show me you voted for X, or I break your legs" problem.
- Canada 7y agoYeah it makes the use of electronic voting less vulnerable to tampering, but obviously the voting still needs to he done in a private booth.
- aeternum 7y agoThere is a simple solution: generate a random public key as part of the voting process and print it out for later verification but also include plenty of other people's public keys in the printout. The voter can remember the position of their own key if they choose to for later validation against the open ledger and can use the others for deniability (if needed).
- danbolt 7y agoI don't feel like I could create trust in democracy with something as complicated as a private key for a mostly non-technical nation such as Canada or France.
- nooron 7y agoA more or less open voting ledger already exists without a blockchain. You can go to your Secretary of State and buy the record of voting in your state for somewhere between 0 and a few thousand dollars. You could also buy it from a private company which aggregates and resells that data. The only information not available is how particular individuals voted.