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1. As mentioned in the OP, there are numerous ways to add content to a copy event, and 'not visible' is not a 'real thing' - see discussion in the OP 2. What a

1. As mentioned in the OP, there are numerous ways to add content to a copy event, and 'not visible' is not a 'real thing' - see discussion in the OP 2. What are we asking the user? Permission to copy from the website? 3. So we are adding a new 'permission' that users must accept to... copy from the website? And that trustworthiness is based on how many other people click 'allow' on a permissions popup? 4. You mean displaying what you just copied to the user, on copy? So the browser would give you a popup with the content of what you copied every time you copy anything? I'm failing to see how any of your proposals solve the problems mentioned and discussed in the OP.

nine_k 7y ago
(2) A permission to copy something not rendered in the selection. (4) To show a dialog showing the actual copied content if the content does not match the rendered visible content of the selection.
- ArchReaper 7y ago
  Both of your answers assume there is a simple and easy way to identify what is "visible on screen" - which if you read through the OP, you will understand that is not an achievable concept.
  - nine_k 7y ago
    Within a browser, which basically knows where each pixel is rendered? I suspect that for the great majority of practical cases, it is possible. Where a definite answer is too hard to achieve, it's safe to err on the side of "not visible".
    - recursive 7y ago
      > I suspect that for the great majority of practical cases, it is possible. The bad guys aren't going to be using the great majority of practical cases.
      - nine_k 7y ago
        My idea is that the minority will be false negatives. The key principle of security is to deny all, allow a closed subset. Same here: allow what is obviously clear and has no hidden parts, and ask a confirmation for all the rest, legitimate or not.
  - wvenable 7y ago
    The browser literally highlights the selection so that seems like a solved problem. I'm in favor of two-tier system where rich applications require permission for enhanced clipboard events but the average site will just copy what is selected without modification.
    - ArchReaper 7y ago
      >The browser literally highlights the selection so that seems like a solved problem. It's nowhere close to a solved problem, and is much more complex than this. Give a read through the comments in the OP for a taste of why.
      - nine_k 7y ago
        I did; it sounded mostly hand-wavy. Maybe there are deep reasons why it's impossible, but they are not well presented in the OP, unfortunately.
- Someone1234 7y ago
  (2) is undefined. What defines "rendered in the selection?" Which clipboard data stream are we even discussing? How far are you going to take the rendered analogy? Is font too small to read, white on white, an invisible font, or similar "rendered?" (4) is better but it would have to be every single time, because (2) is impossible to define.
  - nine_k 7y ago
    (2) is possible to define in practical terms, that is, with a small amount of false positives, and very close to zero amount of false negatives. It's like spam: a precise closed-form analytical definition is impossible, but spam filters do work.
    - ArchReaper 7y ago
      It's absolutely not a reasonable thing to define and target. The bottom line is the feature is a FEATURE and will continue to exist, so trying to police how far websites take it is ultimately a non-starter. Browser vendors could hypothetically start adding specific types of exceptions to make certain types of the 'hidden box' trick not work, but that would ultimately mean those website developers simply switch to whatever method works. The problem isn't solved, it's just re-coded. TLDR: There is NO SOLUTION, because there is NO PROBLEM. The feature works as intended, as written in the spec.
      - chrismorgan 7y ago
        Be careful: just because a feature is working as intended and specified, doesn’t mean that there’s no problem. The spec can be just bad. (I say this as a matter of how you express such things, not about this particular case. I agree with you in considering there to be no bug here, but rather that this is a serious feature that shouldn’t be messed with—and pretty fundamentally can’t without unravelling substantial foundations of the web platform.)
      - nine_k 7y ago
        Think about the reasons why e.g. CORS was invented and implemented, despite XHR requests across domains being a perfectly working feature.

nine_k 7y ago

(2) A permission to copy something not rendered in the selection. (4) To show a dialog showing the actual copied content if the content does not match the rendered visible content of the selection.

ArchReaper 7y ago
Both of your answers assume there is a simple and easy way to identify what is "visible on screen" - which if you read through the OP, you will understand that is not an achievable concept.
- nine_k 7y ago
  Within a browser, which basically knows where each pixel is rendered? I suspect that for the great majority of practical cases, it is possible. Where a definite answer is too hard to achieve, it's safe to err on the side of "not visible".
  - recursive 7y ago
    > I suspect that for the great majority of practical cases, it is possible. The bad guys aren't going to be using the great majority of practical cases.
    - nine_k 7y ago
      My idea is that the minority will be false negatives. The key principle of security is to deny all, allow a closed subset. Same here: allow what is obviously clear and has no hidden parts, and ask a confirmation for all the rest, legitimate or not.
- wvenable 7y ago
  The browser literally highlights the selection so that seems like a solved problem. I'm in favor of two-tier system where rich applications require permission for enhanced clipboard events but the average site will just copy what is selected without modification.
  - ArchReaper 7y ago
    >The browser literally highlights the selection so that seems like a solved problem. It's nowhere close to a solved problem, and is much more complex than this. Give a read through the comments in the OP for a taste of why.
    - nine_k 7y ago
      I did; it sounded mostly hand-wavy. Maybe there are deep reasons why it's impossible, but they are not well presented in the OP, unfortunately.
Someone1234 7y ago
(2) is undefined. What defines "rendered in the selection?" Which clipboard data stream are we even discussing? How far are you going to take the rendered analogy? Is font too small to read, white on white, an invisible font, or similar "rendered?" (4) is better but it would have to be every single time, because (2) is impossible to define.
- nine_k 7y ago
  (2) is possible to define in practical terms, that is, with a small amount of false positives, and very close to zero amount of false negatives. It's like spam: a precise closed-form analytical definition is impossible, but spam filters do work.
  - ArchReaper 7y ago
    It's absolutely not a reasonable thing to define and target. The bottom line is the feature is a FEATURE and will continue to exist, so trying to police how far websites take it is ultimately a non-starter. Browser vendors could hypothetically start adding specific types of exceptions to make certain types of the 'hidden box' trick not work, but that would ultimately mean those website developers simply switch to whatever method works. The problem isn't solved, it's just re-coded. TLDR: There is NO SOLUTION, because there is NO PROBLEM. The feature works as intended, as written in the spec.
    - chrismorgan 7y ago
      Be careful: just because a feature is working as intended and specified, doesn’t mean that there’s no problem. The spec can be just bad. (I say this as a matter of how you express such things, not about this particular case. I agree with you in considering there to be no bug here, but rather that this is a serious feature that shouldn’t be messed with—and pretty fundamentally can’t without unravelling substantial foundations of the web platform.)
    - nine_k 7y ago
      Think about the reasons why e.g. CORS was invented and implemented, despite XHR requests across domains being a perfectly working feature.