7 ms·

> the copy would continue my subjective experience. it may, but it wouldn't be "you". "You"'d experience death, and something else will exist independent of "y

by markyc 7y ago

> the copy would continue my subjective experience. it may, but it wouldn't be "you". "You"'d experience death, and something else will exist independent of "you", but with most of the same features and memories.

tempestn 7y ago
"I" am my thought patterns and memories. It would be me as much as I'm still me when I wake up each morning.
- codeisawesome 7y ago
  I agree with this - but Altered Carbon had this interesting couple scenes where more than one copy of a dude exists. What’s “you” in that event? If we can guarantee teamwork of the clones, we have a new status symbol - else we have created some severe ego/identity problems.
  - AmericanChopper 7y ago
    Yeah I agree with this. As soon as two copies of you exist, your life experiences immediately diverge, and I wouldn’t say you could reasonably be considered the same person. I also think that copying your conscious state from one body to another creates a new person in any case. Everybody except you (including the copy) may consider the new person to be exactly the same as you, but you will now be dead.
- hexaga 7y ago
  [citation needed] Somewhat tongue in cheek, but the point remains. What leads you to believe this? As another reply touches on, there's a straightforward way to verify whether that is the case (for oneself, and not an external observer): Given a perfect clone, uploaded copy, etc, are you as aware of the clone's experience as you are of your own? If the answer is no, why would that change if the original ceases to exist? If the answer is yes, the first thing I'd want to know is _how_ exactly the information (of awareness) is possibly synchronized between hosts (presumably in realtime, at that!).
- saiya-jin 7y ago
  I think we have different perspective on this than you. To me, having my clone doesn't make it "me", no matter how perfect copy he would be. Him having joy doesn't make me having joy. Same with kids - they are basically our clones with genes mixed from both parents. They go on their own path and experiences. Although it it supremely rewarding to see them succeed in life, they are not "me", they are "they". My clones living forever ain't any more rewarding/fulfilling than seeing my kids spread my genes and... live "forever". And we already have that.
  - tempestn 7y ago
    Except that the clone carries your memories. Even if we put aside the question of whether it's really 'you', can we agree that the copy would believe that it's you? Say you go to sleep, then have a copy made. The copy with your memories would wake up, and would remember going to sleep as you and then waking up. So it would feel and believe that it is you. My question then is, in what practical way is it not you?
    - hexaga 7y ago
      > can we agree that the copy would believe that it's you? Absolutely. I think this is a presupposition of the entire scenario. Practically speaking, the only thing that is in question is whether the original's subjective experience extends to the clone. If it doesn't, the clone is useful for those who aren't the original, as a means of backup for important individuals. But, such a clone isn't a viable way to pursue immortality (for the original), as you'd still die if you are cloned in such a fashion; 'your' experience would end as the clone succeeds you, much like the case of having children. I'm reminded of the case of blindsight here, can something be called immortality if it is the equivalent through another body? - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight
      - tempestn 7y ago
        My take is that the only reason we have a feeling of a continuing thread of subjective consciousness is due to memory. The cells in our bodies are continuously being replaced, and there are breaks in our consciousness when we are asleep (or otherwise unconscious). So if a being has an identical brain structure to mine and identical memories, it IS me as much as I am. If you simultaneously delete me and create this copy, it's as much still 'me' as if I'd simply moved my body to a different location. The fact that it's comprised of different physical matter is irrelevant. It would have all of my abilities, thoughts, feelings, memories, and beliefs—it would be me. It would happily continue my subjective experience, relieved that the procedure to prolong life via this backup procedure apparently 'worked'. If you created multiple copies, they would all be equally 'me', although obviously yes, as they then went on to live different lives, they would become different people from each other, just as there are many different paths my life could take looking into the future now.
- jfk13 7y ago
  If you have an identical twin, is your twin "as much you" as you are yourself? If not, at what point between the fertilisation of that single egg cell and today did you become distinct persons? How does that compare to creating an exact replica of you today (assuming that ever becomes possible, which personally I doubt)? At the moment of replication, which of the two is really "you" (can anyone, including you, tell?), and how will that identity develop into the future as the two have divergent experiences? If one of them is destroyed, is the remaining one automatically "you" from then on?
  - ryukafalz 7y ago
    Here's my perspective on this: >If you have an identical twin, is your twin "as much you" as you are yourself? No in pretty much all meaningful senses; there was never a point where you and your identical twin had the same memories. >At the moment of replication, which of the two is really "you" (can anyone, including you, tell?), and how will that identity develop into the future as the two have divergent experiences? This is where the concept of personal identity itself gets tricky. I would say that in a way both of them are you. As far as my subjective experience is concerned, what makes me "me" is primarily my memories, and both instances would share that at that point in time. This also means that, as two instances exist with diverging experiences, their "identities" diverge as well. An outside observer might view the original and the copy differently, but personally I view subjective experience as the most important factor here.

by markyc 7y ago

tempestn 7y ago

"I" am my thought patterns and memories. It would be me as much as I'm still me when I wake up each morning.

codeisawesome 7y ago
I agree with this - but Altered Carbon had this interesting couple scenes where more than one copy of a dude exists. What’s “you” in that event? If we can guarantee teamwork of the clones, we have a new status symbol - else we have created some severe ego/identity problems.
- AmericanChopper 7y ago
  Yeah I agree with this. As soon as two copies of you exist, your life experiences immediately diverge, and I wouldn’t say you could reasonably be considered the same person. I also think that copying your conscious state from one body to another creates a new person in any case. Everybody except you (including the copy) may consider the new person to be exactly the same as you, but you will now be dead.
hexaga 7y ago
[citation needed] Somewhat tongue in cheek, but the point remains. What leads you to believe this? As another reply touches on, there's a straightforward way to verify whether that is the case (for oneself, and not an external observer): Given a perfect clone, uploaded copy, etc, are you as aware of the clone's experience as you are of your own? If the answer is no, why would that change if the original ceases to exist? If the answer is yes, the first thing I'd want to know is _how_ exactly the information (of awareness) is possibly synchronized between hosts (presumably in realtime, at that!).
saiya-jin 7y ago
I think we have different perspective on this than you. To me, having my clone doesn't make it "me", no matter how perfect copy he would be. Him having joy doesn't make me having joy. Same with kids - they are basically our clones with genes mixed from both parents. They go on their own path and experiences. Although it it supremely rewarding to see them succeed in life, they are not "me", they are "they". My clones living forever ain't any more rewarding/fulfilling than seeing my kids spread my genes and... live "forever". And we already have that.
- tempestn 7y ago
  Except that the clone carries your memories. Even if we put aside the question of whether it's really 'you', can we agree that the copy would believe that it's you? Say you go to sleep, then have a copy made. The copy with your memories would wake up, and would remember going to sleep as you and then waking up. So it would feel and believe that it is you. My question then is, in what practical way is it not you?
  - hexaga 7y ago
    > can we agree that the copy would believe that it's you? Absolutely. I think this is a presupposition of the entire scenario. Practically speaking, the only thing that is in question is whether the original's subjective experience extends to the clone. If it doesn't, the clone is useful for those who aren't the original, as a means of backup for important individuals. But, such a clone isn't a viable way to pursue immortality (for the original), as you'd still die if you are cloned in such a fashion; 'your' experience would end as the clone succeeds you, much like the case of having children. I'm reminded of the case of blindsight here, can something be called immortality if it is the equivalent through another body? - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight
    - tempestn 7y ago
      My take is that the only reason we have a feeling of a continuing thread of subjective consciousness is due to memory. The cells in our bodies are continuously being replaced, and there are breaks in our consciousness when we are asleep (or otherwise unconscious). So if a being has an identical brain structure to mine and identical memories, it IS me as much as I am. If you simultaneously delete me and create this copy, it's as much still 'me' as if I'd simply moved my body to a different location. The fact that it's comprised of different physical matter is irrelevant. It would have all of my abilities, thoughts, feelings, memories, and beliefs—it would be me. It would happily continue my subjective experience, relieved that the procedure to prolong life via this backup procedure apparently 'worked'. If you created multiple copies, they would all be equally 'me', although obviously yes, as they then went on to live different lives, they would become different people from each other, just as there are many different paths my life could take looking into the future now.
jfk13 7y ago
If you have an identical twin, is your twin "as much you" as you are yourself? If not, at what point between the fertilisation of that single egg cell and today did you become distinct persons? How does that compare to creating an exact replica of you today (assuming that ever becomes possible, which personally I doubt)? At the moment of replication, which of the two is really "you" (can anyone, including you, tell?), and how will that identity develop into the future as the two have divergent experiences? If one of them is destroyed, is the remaining one automatically "you" from then on?
- ryukafalz 7y ago
  Here's my perspective on this: >If you have an identical twin, is your twin "as much you" as you are yourself? No in pretty much all meaningful senses; there was never a point where you and your identical twin had the same memories. >At the moment of replication, which of the two is really "you" (can anyone, including you, tell?), and how will that identity develop into the future as the two have divergent experiences? This is where the concept of personal identity itself gets tricky. I would say that in a way both of them are you. As far as my subjective experience is concerned, what makes me "me" is primarily my memories, and both instances would share that at that point in time. This also means that, as two instances exist with diverging experiences, their "identities" diverge as well. An outside observer might view the original and the copy differently, but personally I view subjective experience as the most important factor here.