Because this article is an explanation to the anti-encryption crowd the author takes his time to lay out their arguments as a token of understanding their posit

Because this article is an explanation to the anti-encryption crowd the author takes his time to lay out their arguments as a token of understanding their position. Still, i want to bitch about some of them. > In my work at the FBI, I encountered directly how encryption makes it harder for law enforcement to detect, prevent and solve certain types of crime in specific instances. Encrypted data is a known unknown. This doesn't work as an argument without speculating on the scope of unknown unknowns. > I’m confident that this problem can be addressed from a technical perspective. In most cases, it’s just software, and software can be rewritten. That works both ways. ( Source code for effective encryption is less text then this blog piece ) > the United States has not experienced a terrorist or other attack of sufficient magnitude where encryption clearly played a key role in preventing law enforcement from thwarting it And i can't think of any realistic scenario in which it would. The window of cause-and-effect is extremely small. The attack needs to hinge on the tools that the US has authority over. i.e. Why would Osama use WhatsApp on an iPhone in the first place? > inherently vulnerable network of networks This is the wrong way around. Its a 'network of inherently vulnerable networks'. Which is the safest option. ( As the author later notes but doesn't reflect on )