3 ms·
MS "fixed" Vista UAC by making it unsound and not a security boundary in 7. Now I'm not even sure it was a security boundary in Vista, but when you look at the
by temac 7y ago
MS "fixed" Vista UAC by making it unsound and not a security boundary in 7. Now I'm not even sure it was a security boundary in Vista, but when you look at the technical way it is implemented and the additions it came and work with at the ACL level, it was probably at least initially intended to be by their designers.
If anything UAC is a good case to show how security must come with usability, otherwise you just don't get much in the end...
The end result from a technical point of view; well obviously better than nothing, but never count on it. It is actually way more useful to avoid casual mistake than for security purposes.
- delusional 7y agoI disagree. I think UAC (or at least the prompt part) is actually worse than nothing. UAC has poisened a generation of users to just click yes, because security is way too big of a hassle.
- temac 7y agoWe are not mainly talking about the same thing, but on the specific subjet you evocate I actually kind of agree with you, and that was in a way what i meant by stating that security must come with usability. However, I'm not sure about how you can come to your "worse than nothing" conclusion, from a security point of view. Sure if the model let the user authorize nearly anything, they have the power to do it. Sure, if this englob both bening and potentially dangerous modifications, the user can be desensitived. BUT if it still technically achieve its designed purpose, then it is better than nothing in the sense that by nothing, I meant that it would be equivalent as if "yes" was implied all the time. And I find it hard to make the case that mandatory yes all the time and complete lack of access control is better than giving the choice...