I'm concerned as you are. I've come to believe that IRV in a world of Cambridge Analytica spinoffs could be even more dangerous than FPTP. Not only would stra

I'm concerned as you are. I've come to believe that IRV in a world of Cambridge Analytica spinoffs could be even more dangerous than FPTP. Not only would strategic voting be possible (using algorithms to target swing-voters), it'd be almost impossible to detect, and nearly impossible to do general audience journalism about. Intuitively, I'd expect ordinal methods to be much harder to game, but I'm not even convinced this is the case. I've done some research trying to dig into this question, but a lot of the distributed-systems-game-theory-economic-math is hard for me to understand, and isn't focused on the messy problem of consensus between humans as much as it is on the problem of consensus between computer-like agents. In a world of Cambridge Analytica spinoffs, I believe this is an extremely important issue, and that FairVote's take is outdated.