This is a problem with democracy in general; while constitutional constraints theoretically limit the damage the majority can do, in practice "the fox guards th

This is a problem with democracy in general; while constitutional constraints theoretically limit the damage the majority can do, in practice "the fox guards the henhouse" with regard to reifying those constraints. One can easily envision scenarios where the milquetoast centrists defeat stronger positions that would otherwise have won in a two-party, lesser-evil scenario; on the other hand, it could just as easily break the other direction. I'd argue that incentives towards consensus building are net wins for minority voters (in all senses of the word), because it puts the maximum number of voters in play for each candidate. Right now, there is a very real sense in which Texas Democrats and California Republicans have very poor representation; 49% may as well round to zero. (Proportional representation is also worthy of consideration here.) Putting those votes in play for third parties and independents makes candidates more responsive to the whole electorate rather than chasing a small number of swing voters. Even if I manage to gain 70% support of voters, it will all be for naught if my opponent opens an even bigger tent at 75%. It shifts us away from thinking of politics as a zero-sum game.