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One way to think about the Borda is that it gives you the least hated candidate, instead of the most liked. From Wikipedia: The Borda count is intended to elec

One way to think about the Borda is that it gives you the least hated candidate, instead of the most liked. From Wikipedia: The Borda count is intended to elect broadly-acceptable options or candidates, rather than those preferred by a majority, and so is often described as a consensus-based voting system rather than a majoritarian one.

eyegor 7y ago
This seems perfect for the US, and they could even pitch it as such. Although you do start to open the game theory floodgate once you veer beyond dead simple voting systems, which could turn into a gerrymandering game if not carefully restricted.
learnstats2 7y ago
I don't think it works though. Unless you are careful, partisan voters will likely vote their candidate maximum and other candidates minimum - this is called bullet voting on Wikipedia. Non-partisan voters will likely vote genuinely. Since bullet voting is the dominant strategy, the election essentially reduces to First Past the Post and contains all the bad (majoritarian) incentives that FPTP does.
- vkou 7y ago
  Most people aren't completely partisan, when given multiple palatable choices. This is less relevant in the US, with its two-party system, but is quite relevant outside of it.
  - paulgb 7y ago
    My concern is that if even a small number of people bullet vote, other people will see that their votes have less impact and adjust accordingly, in a self-perpetuating cycle.
SamBam 7y ago
Exactly. And (since all voting methods are flawed in some direction), the question is what do you prioritize in elections: the will of the majority, or the "acceptable" choice of even more people. Personally, I think Borda is terrible. Let's suppose the 2016 election was: Clinton, Trump, some milquetoast Republican like Jeb Bush, and someone everyone hated, bringing to total to 4. Suppose 73% of the population were fanatical Clinton fans. However, they didn't want Trump to win, so they voted Jeb #2, even though they'd much rather he didn't win. The 27% of Trump voters also listed Jeb #2. Jeb would win, in this case, even though he was a distant second choice for 73% of the population. (100 * 3 points > 73 * 4 points). Even worse would be if there were 5 or 6 candidates. Now every Clinton #1 vote is worth 6, and every Jeb #2 vote is worth 5. Jeb would win even if 83% of the voters were fanatical Clinton fans. There's no way to distinguish your second vote as "this person is also great" vs "this person is the least worst alternative." The only way to not let your far-distant second choice win is to not vote for them at all, or recruit extra candidates as shields for your preferred candidate. But then we're bringing in strategic voting and all sorts of other messiness.

eyegor 7y ago

This seems perfect for the US, and they could even pitch it as such. Although you do start to open the game theory floodgate once you veer beyond dead simple voting systems, which could turn into a gerrymandering game if not carefully restricted.

learnstats2 7y ago

I don't think it works though. Unless you are careful, partisan voters will likely vote their candidate maximum and other candidates minimum - this is called bullet voting on Wikipedia. Non-partisan voters will likely vote genuinely. Since bullet voting is the dominant strategy, the election essentially reduces to First Past the Post and contains all the bad (majoritarian) incentives that FPTP does.

vkou 7y ago
Most people aren't completely partisan, when given multiple palatable choices. This is less relevant in the US, with its two-party system, but is quite relevant outside of it.
- paulgb 7y ago
  My concern is that if even a small number of people bullet vote, other people will see that their votes have less impact and adjust accordingly, in a self-perpetuating cycle.

SamBam 7y ago

Exactly. And (since all voting methods are flawed in some direction), the question is what do you prioritize in elections: the will of the majority, or the "acceptable" choice of even more people. Personally, I think Borda is terrible. Let's suppose the 2016 election was: Clinton, Trump, some milquetoast Republican like Jeb Bush, and someone everyone hated, bringing to total to 4. Suppose 73% of the population were fanatical Clinton fans. However, they didn't want Trump to win, so they voted Jeb #2, even though they'd much rather he didn't win. The 27% of Trump voters also listed Jeb #2. Jeb would win, in this case, even though he was a distant second choice for 73% of the population. (100 * 3 points > 73 * 4 points). Even worse would be if there were 5 or 6 candidates. Now every Clinton #1 vote is worth 6, and every Jeb #2 vote is worth 5. Jeb would win even if 83% of the voters were fanatical Clinton fans. There's no way to distinguish your second vote as "this person is also great" vs "this person is the least worst alternative." The only way to not let your far-distant second choice win is to not vote for them at all, or recruit extra candidates as shields for your preferred candidate. But then we're bringing in strategic voting and all sorts of other messiness.