5 ms·

I don't think Borda count is an acceptable alternative. It's vulnerable to the teaming problem; elections would turn into contests of which party can nominate

I don't think Borda count is an acceptable alternative. It's vulnerable to the teaming problem; elections would turn into contests of which party can nominate the most candidates. The simplest alternative you can actually get people behind and that doesn't have serious problems is probably approval voting. (For those unfamiliar: Just vote for any number of candidates, most votes wins.) It's simple, it works well, it doesn't really have glaring flaws like vote-splitting or teaming. There are various ways it's still not ideal, but if you want something for people to rally behind, I think its simplicity makes it the best candidate for that.

shakna 7y ago
> I don't think Borda count is an acceptable alternative. It's vulnerable to the teaming problem; elections would turn into contests of which party can nominate the most candidates. Isn't the simple solution there to limit the number of candidates a party can put forward? Forcing the party to try and be united about who they want representing an area?
- bargle0 7y ago
  Would that force them to be united? Putting some kind of rule in place might just force parties to balkanize. The barrier to candidate proliferation might be the ability to raise funds. Would a party get more out of one candidate, or two candidates with half the money?
  - JAlexoid 7y ago
    Republican and Democratic parties are already conglomerates of ideologies. Both should split up, for the better gauge of people's opinions.
- BurningFrog 7y ago
  You can always launch several parties.
- Sniffnoy 7y ago
  OK, let's say we institute this cap. The obvious thing to do then is to spawn off officially-separate parties that can nominate more candidates for you. You could outlaw that, I suppose, but now we're getting into the area of things you need a judge to adjudicate, and, well... yeah. Anyway yeah you see where I'm going with this. When I say "party", that's shorthand -- I'm not talking about literal party organizations. The teaming problem is just that having a bunch of candidates that are similar to each other increases the chance that one of them will win; it's the opposite of the vote-splitting problem, where having similar candidates decreases the chance that any of them will win. This problem doesn't require a formal party organization in order to manifest; strategic nomination is still possible. Ideally one wants a voting system that is "cloneproof", i.e., has neither of these problems. (IRV is cloneproof, actually, but it has other glaring problems -- most notably its lack of monotonicity.)

shakna 7y ago

> I don't think Borda count is an acceptable alternative. It's vulnerable to the teaming problem; elections would turn into contests of which party can nominate the most candidates. Isn't the simple solution there to limit the number of candidates a party can put forward? Forcing the party to try and be united about who they want representing an area?

bargle0 7y ago
Would that force them to be united? Putting some kind of rule in place might just force parties to balkanize. The barrier to candidate proliferation might be the ability to raise funds. Would a party get more out of one candidate, or two candidates with half the money?
- JAlexoid 7y ago
  Republican and Democratic parties are already conglomerates of ideologies. Both should split up, for the better gauge of people's opinions.
BurningFrog 7y ago
You can always launch several parties.
Sniffnoy 7y ago
OK, let's say we institute this cap. The obvious thing to do then is to spawn off officially-separate parties that can nominate more candidates for you. You could outlaw that, I suppose, but now we're getting into the area of things you need a judge to adjudicate, and, well... yeah. Anyway yeah you see where I'm going with this. When I say "party", that's shorthand -- I'm not talking about literal party organizations. The teaming problem is just that having a bunch of candidates that are similar to each other increases the chance that one of them will win; it's the opposite of the vote-splitting problem, where having similar candidates decreases the chance that any of them will win. This problem doesn't require a formal party organization in order to manifest; strategic nomination is still possible. Ideally one wants a voting system that is "cloneproof", i.e., has neither of these problems. (IRV is cloneproof, actually, but it has other glaring problems -- most notably its lack of monotonicity.)