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The difference is pretty big because there are a couple of conflicting things with the regulatory regime: it must be predictable (if things change rapidly, it b
by scarejunba 7y ago
The difference is pretty big because there are a couple of conflicting things with the regulatory regime: it must be predictable (if things change rapidly, it becomes hard to comply and you'll get defacto non-compliance and shadow data storage) and it must be up to date. Policy makers usually don't specifically want punishments or changes in behaviour, they want outcomes.
In a liability environment, you attempt to describe the true cost and risk and allow the company to adapt to changing environments.
A practical real-world difference is "password rotation requirements". Most real-world security professionals knew the dangers of strict password rotation requirements for years before NIST could release information on it. And just because the process of standardization must necessarily be slow, the NIST requirements would then have to flow to other departments so they can then update their standards and so on.
Today, in most financial and healthcare companies, password rotation standards are rampant despite it being the case that NIST has advised against. This is often because the companies don't want to spend the money to alter policies but also often because in the 'no-man-is-an-island' interconnectedness of firms, policies in one can impose corresponding policies in others. So that means that your new startup will need to rotate passwords every month in order to integrate with (say) Bank of America.
Apart from all that, if you genuinely think about it, we want to do cost-benefit analyses on this. If the risk of leakage of customer data is low enough and we value it at some $x dollars per unit, then there's some $y of cost above which it isn't worth it. This intuitively makes sense since customer data, no matter how personal, isn't worth infinity. If it were, no one would collect it. No one. In fact, by giving me your phone number I would suddenly be holding an artefact of infinite value. Or by giving Amazon your shipping address. No one wants that liability and information exchange would halt despite everyone (in reality) wanting it to happen.
- zaarn 7y agoPassword Rotation and stagnant security practises are IMO a result of liablity environments, not regulatory environments.
- scarejunba 7y agoInteresting. I can see the rationale for that: we currently exist in a liability environment and that's where we are. The CYA process means that people stick to what's already there because introducing a change means you're on the hook for the change. What I hoped for is that I, as a startup, can beat the government on picking a security standard because the government has to cater to all but I can just beat it by being better than Big Slow Dinosaur (BSD). But because I have to integrate at some level with BSD that has to follow the government I lose that advantage. I suppose, with a regulator capable of moving fast to respond to threats, aware of sunset periods, regulation could be superior. Somehow, I expect forums like this one to be full of software engineers complaining about "the constantly changing requirements from NIST" if that were to happen.
- icebraining 7y agoIf instead of liability, you had a regulation mandating the implementation of specific guidelines, they'd use the ones produced by NIST, which until 2017 also recommended password rotation.
- zaarn 7y agoThere is no reason why regulatory bodies cannot be up-to-date with the latest developments.
- scarejunba 7y agoAnd yet, strangely, they never do.
- zaarn 7y agoMaybe because American legislation loves to cripple regulatory bodies?