4 ms·
The article is not a complete overview of the situation. For that we go to Wiki. "Boeing considered MCAS part of the flight control system, and elected to not
by sqldba 7y ago
The article is not a complete overview of the situation. For that we go to Wiki.
"Boeing considered MCAS part of the flight control system, and elected to not describe it in the flight manual or in training materials."
It... "could not be overridden by pilot resistance against the control wheel as on previous versions of the 737."
"Following the Lion Air accident, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB)[13] which outlined the many indications and effects resulting from erroneous AOA data and provided instructions to turn off the motorized trim system for the remainder of the flight, and trim manually instead. Until Boeing supplemented the manuals[14] and training, pilots were unaware of the existence of MCAS due to its omission from the crew manual and no coverage in training.[12]"
It wasn't just "a software bug". It wasn't just culture cutting corners. Even after the first crash they continued to cover up that MCAS was the cause. After the second crash they still refused and it wasn't until airlines started grounding planes that they caved in.
There's a lot more than regulatory oversight could have done. We haven't reached the limits in the slightest.
- angry_octet 7y agoAgreed. There is a key part of the regulatory system which has not happened yet, which is deterrence. People need to suffer serious personal consequences for dereliction and cover-up, including criminal liability. In fact, the post Lion crash cover-up should perhaps be punished more severely than the decision to leave known risks (AoA sensor failure, inability to override) untreated.