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Has anyone considered that the MCAS bug was just simply nasty and difficult to detect in their simulator? It’s easy to look back with retrospect and make sweep
by dmix 7y ago
Has anyone considered that the MCAS bug was just simply nasty and difficult to detect in their simulator?
It’s easy to look back with retrospect and make sweeping judgements about the entire company and the FAA.
But fundamentally this was all over, as the author mentions, a single software bug and a lack of backup sensors to offset the risk.
In addition it was the technical pilots who asked for the stick to be harder than it was, which added to the difficulty in that unique situation.
The MAX was otherwise a very safe plane was it not?
There will always be limits to how effective regulatory oversight can be.
- golemotron 7y agoIt was simply bad systems engineering. Using software to compensate for hardware like that is like coding "subtract one" when two plus two yields five. In software this hack is explicit, so perhaps Boeing engineers can be forgiven for not seeing it when it straddles hardware and software.
- binky 7y agoThe bug is a symptom of bad architecture. Bad architecture is an outcome of taming loud engineers in sake of short term business outcomes.
- linuxftw 7y agoPretty much. If something is theoretically possible it needs to be defended against. I'm sure there's no shortage of people that could have looked at the requirements and figured out how to make it break, but Boeing outsourced. I'm hoping we get more details so we can help build a text-book case against software outsourcing.
- sqldba 7y agoThe article is not a complete overview of the situation. For that we go to Wiki. "Boeing considered MCAS part of the flight control system, and elected to not describe it in the flight manual or in training materials." It... "could not be overridden by pilot resistance against the control wheel as on previous versions of the 737." "Following the Lion Air accident, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB)[13] which outlined the many indications and effects resulting from erroneous AOA data and provided instructions to turn off the motorized trim system for the remainder of the flight, and trim manually instead. Until Boeing supplemented the manuals[14] and training, pilots were unaware of the existence of MCAS due to its omission from the crew manual and no coverage in training.[12]" It wasn't just "a software bug". It wasn't just culture cutting corners. Even after the first crash they continued to cover up that MCAS was the cause. After the second crash they still refused and it wasn't until airlines started grounding planes that they caved in. There's a lot more than regulatory oversight could have done. We haven't reached the limits in the slightest.
- angry_octet 7y agoAgreed. There is a key part of the regulatory system which has not happened yet, which is deterrence. People need to suffer serious personal consequences for dereliction and cover-up, including criminal liability. In fact, the post Lion crash cover-up should perhaps be punished more severely than the decision to leave known risks (AoA sensor failure, inability to override) untreated.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- acomjean 7y agoIts not that it was just a difficult bug. Its that politics got in the way of doing the right thing, which is declare the airplane "new" and re-train the pilots (vs a plain modification). Boeing didn't want to do that as customers didn't want the retraining expense so they used lobbying and cut the corner.
- sambull 7y agoNo its not to the standards of a modern design. It's one of the primary reasons they grandfathered the airframe in, not having to address safety concerns like their doors.
- meristem 7y agoThey grandfathered the frame--and added MCAS-- to avoid a new certificate and added cost/time to their customers. What you point out is one of many consequences, not the reason. (Aircraft doors are interesting on their own as well, due to the assumptions that drive design, testing, and certification.)
- privateSFacct 7y agoIt also relied on a the pilot as a critical control - which is why there was no real automated backup or redundancy. Not unreasonable, doing stab trim cutout is a memory item for most operating manuals - pilots were already the circuit breaker for other stab trim issues. Automation working - great. Maintenance failures? Provide error messages (which occured here). Maintenance issues not resolved and automation misbehevior? Stab trim cutout memory item. Despite all the claims that the stab trim cutout did not work all real evidence is that it did. Other issues around pressure on flight surfaces not explored properly making recovery in overspeed and other conditions very hard. Badly designed system? Definitely. Brittle when facing poor maintenance? Clearly! Not taking into account broad pilot population. Of course. Definitely should be fixed, and frankly automation probably will be increased to decrease assumptions around pilot behavior which can be variable. This accident was the result not only of this bug but a chain of issues. That's why flying in the US is pretty safe, the chain from procurement to maintenance to pilot training is strong so compensates for poor elements. If you follow SAA technical for example there is evidence overseas that bogus parts are making it into plane repairs, with predictably bad results. We are not seeing that in the US (yet), though if inspections get soft I'm sure it would show up here too. Those bogus repairs will mean that some automation will break and the plane may not behave properly in ways that could have been designed around with better assumptions. My prediction? We are going to get iphone style authentication / serial number chips in key plane parts with electrical connections and the plane will eventually refuse to fly without the right parts - just like your coffee maker and iphone. Right now it is trust based.
- largbae 7y agos/This accident/These accidents/ As you'll find in this article below, Boeing specifically removed the yoke-back function, which is the natural pilot input to nose up the plane. They also specifically for the MAX removed the separate switch for automatic stab trim assistance, so you have to turn off the motorized function entirely to turn off automated inputs including MCAS. The Lion Air crew could be heard on the radio saying that they did disable the stab trim, but in this situation the force required on the manual trim wheel was beyond the pilots' strength. The pilots turned the electronic stab trim back on in hopes of using the powered system to get back up, after which the undocumented and unstoppable MCAS nosed down the plane again, killing them and their passengers. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeings-emergency-procedure-for-737-max-may-have-failed-on-ethiopian-flight/?amp=1 https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boein... Your post reads like a sophisticated attempt to blame the victims, or at least the pilots and ground crews of the victims. These crashes were not caused by poor pilots, but rather secrets on top of secrets, all by Boeing, all for money. The MAX had new aerodynamic characteristics, but that needed to be a secret. So MCAS was added to the electronic trim assistance to hide the new characteristics, and the switch to disable it was removed to protect the secret. A faulty AOA sensor was now able to bring down the plane, but in order to keep the secret the single AOA option was still available and sold. Maintenance crews regardless of quality would not have been aware of the criticality of the AOA's secret role as a single point of failure for the whole plane. When the first one crashed, secrets covered it up. When the second one crashed, it still took all of those "ppor maintenance", "broad quality" non-US airlines and regulators to bring a stop to it. And apparently the secret-keepers are still trying to hide. Please don't blame dead pilots for this.
- klyrs 7y ago> Has anyone considered that the MCAS bug was just simply nasty and difficult to detect in their simulator? That was the assumption a year ago. Investigation has turned up tons of evidence against your null hypothesis. Crucially, this behavior was observed in the simulator and reported up the line. > ... and a lack of backup sensors to offset the risk. Not when multiple red flags were raised internally, and the backup sensors were sold as a premium upgrade. > There will always be limits to how effective regulatory oversight can be. Especially when we allow corporations to do their own regulatory "oversight"
- jorprp93j 7y agoDid you see the article where pilots testing the MCAS software said it was a mess? Years before they shipped it?
- CydeWeys 7y ago"The MAX was otherwise a very safe plane was it not?" Huh? The MAX was the most unsafe major new plane in ... something like decades. You can't make a statement excluding all the bad and then trying to say it's good. The bad is exactly what you're getting at here. And even apart from that, the 737 is an obsolete, decades-old design. The only reason they're still making new iterations of it is because of type ratings requirements; if you actually wanted to make a great plane, you'd never base it on the 737. It has ancient analog gauge displays (which are now simulated digitally), doesn't use electronic flight controls, is too low to the ground leading to increased potential of foreign object debris into the engines, and as a consequence of this the newer more efficient jet engines don't even fit underneath the wings properly and hence had to be shifted forward into an unstable position that necessitated MCAS. There's no two ways about it, there's nothing good about the 737 MAX, even apart from all the crashes.