3 ms·
Is it not indicative, though, of the progression of changes to MCAS over time, different speed envelopes, significantly more elevator control, etc. And no proc
by tyingq 7y ago
Is it not indicative, though, of the progression of changes to MCAS over time, different speed envelopes, significantly more elevator control, etc. And no process to decide when those changes should warrant additional documentation or training requirements?
Meaning, unrelated to "the glitch", but could have exposed info or training that would have made "the glitch" more survivable, because the pilots might have known MCAS was in play.
- missosoup 7y ago> Is it not indicative, though, of the progression of changes to MCAS over time, different speed envelopes, significantly more elevator control, etc. And no process to decide when those changes should warrant additional documentation or training requirements? Yes, that's exactly what it is. And that in itself is a big deal. But it is not the 'omg pilots knew about MCAS causing crashes and didn't/couldn't report it' that the media coverage is spinning it as. The title very misleading. I've had people call me a 'boeing shill' (what would such a person even have to gain??) for pointing out these sorts of issues in the coverage back when the media was saying aoa-disagree would have prevented this from happening (it wouldn't, most commercial pilots have no native idea what aoa is, only airlines with ex-military pilots would get benefit from that package). The vast majority of people just read the headlines, assume them to be true, and move on.
- dec0dedab0de 7y agoI've had people call me a 'boeing shill' (what would such a person even have to gain??) I'm not agreeing with them, but if they're calling you a shill they're accusing you of being paid by Boeing.
- dmix 7y agoThere was already a process to decide if MCAS should be in the manual. That was exactly the job of these two technical pilots who both signed off saying the MCAS was “benign” and didn’t need to be included in the manual. These guys had direct communication with the FAA who clearly had the final word on the manual. The FAA trusted the technical pilots word (and I doubt it was just these two guys alone that decided). The question is whether these simulator test pilots were under any pressure from Boeing to downplay it but based on their lawyers statements they seem to be defending themselves and saying the conversation was simply being misinterpreted and they didn’t have concerns. The other question is whether the FAA was too quick to trust the information coming to them.