> The decision being made before that result is perceived is certainly not the way to prove the decision doesn't come from consciousness and perception (biases

> The decision being made before that result is perceived is certainly not the way to prove the decision doesn't come from consciousness and perception (biases and heuristics aside, thanks to millions of years of animal brains). Why not? Surely if consciousness and perception are creating the decision, they should be the first which contain information about it. > And it might be that, for most decisions, perceptions and heuristics do play a part. Certainly. It seems highly unlikely to me that perceptions and heuristic do not play a part: as an additional input into the decision-making system, derived from physical sensory input and memory. > That again doesn't mean all decisions are pure automatons. How does it not? I presume the distinction lies in the exact definition of "pure automaton", but it sounds to me like the term's intent is to try to divorce human decision-making from pure, causal (or, in the worst case, random) reaction to input. I don't see how this would be possible. How would the non-"pure automaton" part look like?