7 ms·

Free will is, in common parlance, a mechanism which produces decisions which stems from that consciousness and perception. If the decision precedes it, then fre

Free will is, in common parlance, a mechanism which produces decisions which stems from that consciousness and perception. If the decision precedes it, then free will does not exist (and in my opinion cannot). Humans are still demonstrably able to perform decisions which vary based on input, of course, so in that sense, "free" will is indisputable.

raverbashing 7y ago
> which stems from that consciousness and perception. If the decision precedes it The decision being made before that result is perceived is certainly not the way to prove the decision doesn't come from consciousness and perception (biases and heuristics aside, thanks to millions of years of animal brains). And it might be that, for most decisions, perceptions and heuristics do play a part. That again doesn't mean all decisions are pure automatons.
- feanaro 7y ago
  > The decision being made before that result is perceived is certainly not the way to prove the decision doesn't come from consciousness and perception (biases and heuristics aside, thanks to millions of years of animal brains). Why not? Surely if consciousness and perception are creating the decision, they should be the first which contain information about it. > And it might be that, for most decisions, perceptions and heuristics do play a part. Certainly. It seems highly unlikely to me that perceptions and heuristic do not play a part: as an additional input into the decision-making system, derived from physical sensory input and memory. > That again doesn't mean all decisions are pure automatons. How does it not? I presume the distinction lies in the exact definition of "pure automaton", but it sounds to me like the term's intent is to try to divorce human decision-making from pure, causal (or, in the worst case, random) reaction to input. I don't see how this would be possible. How would the non-"pure automaton" part look like?
zuminator 7y ago
> If the decision precedes it, then free will does not exist (and in my opinion cannot). One of the problems I have with the Libet experiment is that the subject-reported awareness of conscious thought time is assumed to be accurate. But how can it be? The subject is being asked to move their hand. That takes a conscious effort. But the subject is also being asked to monitor thinking about moving their hand. That's a whole new task. Then they're being asked to report on their memory of thinking about moving their hand. Yet another task. Normally when you move your hand, you just move it without the additional perceptions of "I am now thinking about moving my hand. I am now going to tell someone of the moment that I became aware of thinking about my hand." We don't normally reflect upon our motor movements in such a fashion. If you stopped to reflect upon each step before you took it, you'd be tripping on yourself all the time. So the reporting task is an unnatural and artificial burden above and beyond our normal mode of thought. I would contend that the extra tasks introduce a delay in the subject's self-awareness because the subject has to now additionally wait for the constructive thought "observing myself in the act of thinking about moving my hand" to rise to the threshold wherein that thought becomes part of the internal monologue of the conscious mind. On top of that, perhaps the mind plays a trick on itself regarding conscious thought. When your eyes quickly saccade from one spot to another, there is motion blur, but you don't perceive it; your mind edits it out since it conveys no useful information about the world. Similarly, when you are contemplating taking an action, your brain has to make certain calculations before it can execute that action. Your motor cortex needs to communicate with the frontal lobe and the parietal lobe. You need to refer to past calculations of similar movements so that you don't overshoot or miss the mark. All of that takes time. Perhaps the brain edits out that time because it would be wasteful and non-productive to monitor the experience of "thought delays."
rowanG077 7y ago
I can write a computer program in 5 minutes that is able to perform decisions which vary based on input. That doesn't mean that program has free will.
- feanaro 7y ago
  Hint: we're saying the same thing. The only difference between such a program and a human is in the number of degrees of freedom of the algorithm (and hence the complexity of relationship between the input and the output). Humans do not possess a free will in this sense either. How could they? Their actions have to be causally dependent on the input, otherwise their behaviour would be magical and unrelated to reality.
  - rowanG077 7y ago
    Quantum mechanics obviously provides a physical mechanism to implement free will. Whether this is the case is a different matter but the laws of physics don't rule it out.
    - feanaro 7y ago
      It's not so obvious to me. The usual argument I've heard is that quantum randomness might sometimes be controlled by a non-physical entity external to our universe (in the sense of biasing measurements in critical moments). While an interesting fantastic idea, I don't think it brings much to the table, given that it is not testable. Is this what you meant or something else? Otherwise, quantum mechanics at best leaves room for randomness (non-determinism, stochasticity) of the will, not what people usually mean when they say it.
      - rowanG077 7y ago
        If quantum randomness is controlled by a non-physical entity then it's just moving the goal posts. For me it's really simple. Free will is people not having a pre-destined path. If the non-determinism of quantum mechanics influences the way the lives of people change through their decisions this means there is free will. Everything else is really just pure philosophical drivel that can't be verified.

raverbashing 7y ago

> which stems from that consciousness and perception. If the decision precedes it The decision being made before that result is perceived is certainly not the way to prove the decision doesn't come from consciousness and perception (biases and heuristics aside, thanks to millions of years of animal brains). And it might be that, for most decisions, perceptions and heuristics do play a part. That again doesn't mean all decisions are pure automatons.

feanaro 7y ago
> The decision being made before that result is perceived is certainly not the way to prove the decision doesn't come from consciousness and perception (biases and heuristics aside, thanks to millions of years of animal brains). Why not? Surely if consciousness and perception are creating the decision, they should be the first which contain information about it. > And it might be that, for most decisions, perceptions and heuristics do play a part. Certainly. It seems highly unlikely to me that perceptions and heuristic do not play a part: as an additional input into the decision-making system, derived from physical sensory input and memory. > That again doesn't mean all decisions are pure automatons. How does it not? I presume the distinction lies in the exact definition of "pure automaton", but it sounds to me like the term's intent is to try to divorce human decision-making from pure, causal (or, in the worst case, random) reaction to input. I don't see how this would be possible. How would the non-"pure automaton" part look like?

zuminator 7y ago

> If the decision precedes it, then free will does not exist (and in my opinion cannot). One of the problems I have with the Libet experiment is that the subject-reported awareness of conscious thought time is assumed to be accurate. But how can it be? The subject is being asked to move their hand. That takes a conscious effort. But the subject is also being asked to monitor thinking about moving their hand. That's a whole new task. Then they're being asked to report on their memory of thinking about moving their hand. Yet another task. Normally when you move your hand, you just move it without the additional perceptions of "I am now thinking about moving my hand. I am now going to tell someone of the moment that I became aware of thinking about my hand." We don't normally reflect upon our motor movements in such a fashion. If you stopped to reflect upon each step before you took it, you'd be tripping on yourself all the time. So the reporting task is an unnatural and artificial burden above and beyond our normal mode of thought. I would contend that the extra tasks introduce a delay in the subject's self-awareness because the subject has to now additionally wait for the constructive thought "observing myself in the act of thinking about moving my hand" to rise to the threshold wherein that thought becomes part of the internal monologue of the conscious mind. On top of that, perhaps the mind plays a trick on itself regarding conscious thought. When your eyes quickly saccade from one spot to another, there is motion blur, but you don't perceive it; your mind edits it out since it conveys no useful information about the world. Similarly, when you are contemplating taking an action, your brain has to make certain calculations before it can execute that action. Your motor cortex needs to communicate with the frontal lobe and the parietal lobe. You need to refer to past calculations of similar movements so that you don't overshoot or miss the mark. All of that takes time. Perhaps the brain edits out that time because it would be wasteful and non-productive to monitor the experience of "thought delays."

rowanG077 7y ago

I can write a computer program in 5 minutes that is able to perform decisions which vary based on input. That doesn't mean that program has free will.

feanaro 7y ago
Hint: we're saying the same thing. The only difference between such a program and a human is in the number of degrees of freedom of the algorithm (and hence the complexity of relationship between the input and the output). Humans do not possess a free will in this sense either. How could they? Their actions have to be causally dependent on the input, otherwise their behaviour would be magical and unrelated to reality.
- rowanG077 7y ago
  Quantum mechanics obviously provides a physical mechanism to implement free will. Whether this is the case is a different matter but the laws of physics don't rule it out.
  - feanaro 7y ago
    It's not so obvious to me. The usual argument I've heard is that quantum randomness might sometimes be controlled by a non-physical entity external to our universe (in the sense of biasing measurements in critical moments). While an interesting fantastic idea, I don't think it brings much to the table, given that it is not testable. Is this what you meant or something else? Otherwise, quantum mechanics at best leaves room for randomness (non-determinism, stochasticity) of the will, not what people usually mean when they say it.
    - rowanG077 7y ago
      If quantum randomness is controlled by a non-physical entity then it's just moving the goal posts. For me it's really simple. Free will is people not having a pre-destined path. If the non-determinism of quantum mechanics influences the way the lives of people change through their decisions this means there is free will. Everything else is really just pure philosophical drivel that can't be verified.