https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/04/30/politics/boeing-sensor-737-max-faa/index.html https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/04/30/politics/boeing-sensor-737-... "Single sources

https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/04/30/politics/boeing-sensor-737-max-faa/index.html https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/04/30/politics/boeing-sensor-737-... "Single sources of data are considered acceptable in such cases by our industry," the Boeing spokesperson said. This has never been true, and this article was from a time when Boeing was still successfully covering up now public information (they did indeed simulate the sensor failure mode, which is what this new scandal is about). The decision to have the new MCAS use a single physical sensor itself flies in the face of over a half century of aviation engineering practices. That design decision alone is already negligence. Planes typically have 3 fully independent hydraulic control systems for redundancy. Flight computers are redundant and run on different architectures (there is lots of interesting reading about this if you google). Boeing has known how to do fault tolerance correctly on planes for a long time. In this case management faced a conflict between forseen catastrophic failures and the bottom line, and buried warnings from engineers and pilots. After the first crash Boeing should have told airlines to ground their planes. They had all the information. Instead they attempted to shift blame to pilots while continuing to lie about the safety of the plane. It doesnt get much clearer than this.