People really have an unhealthy fascination with SIGINT. It's really not the disproportionate threat people think it is, or should be most concerned with. Tools

People really have an unhealthy fascination with SIGINT. It's really not the disproportionate threat people think it is, or should be most concerned with. Tools such as encryption, privacy-focused messaging mediums, VPNs, etc might serve to complicate an investigation by local law-enforcement agencies, but will not be able to defend against a more sophisticated targeted attack. While absolutely best practice, this is analogous to using an armored car to deliver messages from someone living on a park bench to someone living in a cardboard box. I absolutely agree with the use of these tools, as long as you know their limitations and the threat profile they're targeted against. A messaging medium that does not store chat history will absolutely aid you in the event that your phone/computer is seized by law-enforcement to be forensically examined. However, the biggest problem is the endpoints. Using a zero-day/backdoor to root a device on the end of the messaging chain is orders of magnitude easier than trying to break encryption. Why bother using all that computing power when you can just use a rootkit to read the screen buffer in real-time? You might be using all the best encryption tools, etc... but if SIGINT is really what you're concerned about then you'd be best off treating your PC/Phone as being the chief vulnerability.