That it came 4 years after was, in good part, thanks to the "agriculture only in Germany" Morgenthau Plan. The subsequent disclosure, possible extension of the

That it came 4 years after was, in good part, thanks to the "agriculture only in Germany" Morgenthau Plan. The subsequent disclosure, possible extension of the war[1] with Goebbels making broadcasts against it in 44 & 45, and US media, politicians and public turning against it thankfully thoroughly poisoned it. It took a while to spin up a workable replacement (and one that would pass Congress), though the sheer extremity of the Morgenthau Plan undoubtedly helped that along. I have never got the impression Bretton Woods contributed to the demise of Morgenthau/rise of Marshall, but I can't rule it out. I haven't enough of the detail of Presidential and Congressional machinations. It's always read like Marshall was result of reaction to, and fallout from Morgenthau, as well as the inconvenient truth that a bankrupt Europe can't trade much at all. :) That the US was going to be the new hegemon was clear in hmm, probably 43, perhaps even late 42. It just wasn't yet remotely palatable. Thus it wasn't unexpected that was the stance of the US going into Bretton Woods. The US had been pushing against European empire since earliest talk of lend-lease before Pearl Harbor, and obviously pre-war with less consequence. Even going back into the era the US still spoke overtly of an American Empire. Of course there was GB reluctance to accept their new role as junior partner - and some degree of not realising the actual implications of this. One easy example of that being famously difficult Monty during Market-Garden in 44. Some parts of the UK political spectrum has still not recognised our place in the post-war scheme of things. Cough Brexit cough. More among some who voted Brexit than the instigators necessarily. Suez was merely the first concrete demonstration of France and Britain's new lowered significance. Not accepting UK decline has been something of a post-war Tory party theme. By Suez, the US absolutely had the strength, politics and attitude that their wish was prime. Course UK Labour had the very overt post-war policy to shed Empire in this period. So during Labour administrations, far from everyone having to fight off colonial masters, some were positively pushed, somewhat reluctantly and surprised out the exit... Which is another can of worms far too complex to play out on HN. In France I don't think de Gaulle ever got past having to ask the US for the 45 loan. So in summary, yes, it's hugely complex. Had the US not been the only nation not near bankruptcy, the power dynamic of negotiations would have been very different. At the very least with more balance the World Bank and IMF would have looked different. Yet even so, the hope in Europe was it was still a better model to avoid 1929-1945 ever again. FWIW Post-Suez under Nasser didn't turn out at all well for the Egyptians. Let's leave that one unopened though. ;) [1] We'll never know, but there's a very credible case to be made that the proposed toppling of Hitler in 44, and subsequent surrender would have actually come, but for the publicity around Morgenthau. Being sent back to an agrarian age made surrender pointless, even though they had obviously already lost the war.