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It depends on your definition of a computer. A bare-metal embedded system could be fine without any software updates, ever. Some of them are in-place sensors f
by ClumsyPilot 7y ago
It depends on your definition of a computer.
A bare-metal embedded system could be fine without any software updates, ever. Some of them are in-place sensors for weather/temperature/whatever.
Think of an Arduino with an Ethernet shield, that measures air temperature, encrypts with AES and sends it over plain TCP connection.
There is no port is open for listening, and there is nothing to hack into.
The only possible vulnerability is OTA update, but in some cases you might purposefully avoid that. For example in the rail industry, the only way to update their devices is to physically change the hardware, and that is done intentionally.
The hardware might be sleeping for 99% of it's service life, and is typically over-engineered. They could run into the next century if corrosion doesn't get them.
- GhettoMaestro 7y agoClient side vulns do exist. Your model is not complete.
- ClumsyPilot 7y agoI am not claiming they don't, but often these devices only run thousand lined of code, not millions. The security challenge is much, much smaller than securing the Linux kernel.
- joosters 7y agoIf it's doing TCP then there's a whole network stack to attack. I bet there's a big range of embedded systems that can be crashed because they have a simplistic cut-down, non-hardened TCP/IP/Ethernet implementation that can be abused. You've got a chance of breaking it through sending malformed packets to cause a panic, or just exhausting its memory - which might cause it to reboot (maybe lots of fragmented packets?) The lack of listening ports might shrink the attack surface, but a malicious endpoint that it connects to might be able to confuse it. (or perhaps some evil MITM attacker)
- thisisnico 7y agoI bet that these devices are local only. Working in IT the security measures for these devices are likely that they are sitting on their own isolated VLAN. Routing is likely controlled by layer 3 switches with dedicated ACLs to only allow certain systems to obtain access to that VLAN. If it's a rail company the network itself is likely protected by an Cisco ASA or ASA style dedicated network security appliance. Networks have been hardened pretty well. Most often the exploits that IT is worrying about is application-based and user-based (social engineering).
- joosters 7y agoIt's probably the best way to secure them - but I think that defeats the spirit of the 'connected to the internet' part of this uptime security challenge :)
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- wbl 7y agoNetwork hardening fundamentally has sone serious limitations because it doesnt expose the principals to the devices controlling access.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- ClumsyPilot 7y agoMalicious endpoint is certainly an interesting scenario, let me work through a few possibilities: 1. Wiznet produces chips where the entire network stack is implemented in hardware, there is no code. Malformed packets will never touch my code. http://shop.wiznet.eu/chips/w5500.html http://shop.wiznet.eu/chips/w5500.html However, this is a minority of devices. 2. These devices typically have no dynamic memory allocation at all, they will work with a circular buffer of fixed size. Normally they can't run out of memory. 3. You might be able to clog up their CPU, however they typically use an RTOS, those operating systems will place hard limits on amount of CPU time different components of the system could take. At best, you will prevent the device from sending out anything over the network while you are attacking it. 4. Of-course, if there are mistakes in the TCP/IP stack, you might cause issues. Most of them are using lwIP stack, I am not qualified to comment on it's security. https://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip/ https://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip/