4 ms·
Even better, Malware can (popular malware doesn't so far as I can see today, but could if other methods stopped working) straight up lie in SNI and in the old T
by tialaramex 7y ago
Even better, Malware can (popular malware doesn't so far as I can see today, but could if other methods stopped working) straight up lie in SNI and in the old TLS 1.2 plaintext Certificate message, and produce plausible yet entirely misleading results in your inspection apparatus.
A real client expects the encrypted parts that follow Certificate to match up and should abort if they don't, but malware is under no obligation to do that, and a 3rd party which can't decrypt the rest of the handshake won't know e.g.
Malware client: SNI for bigbank.example (knowing bigbank will have been excluded from snooping rules at the target)
Malware C&C server: 100% Legitimate Certificate copied from bigbank.example
Malware client: Cool, let's continue with encrypted setup (ignores the pretence that this is bigbank.example and now communicates with the C&C server undetected and encrypted knowing the logs will just show "bigbank.example")
"Security" products can't protect against this without snooping each and every single transaction, but many will be deployed by ignorant/ well-meaning people who don't understand how this works and thus that the products can't actually do what they appear to offer to do.