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> To me, that's a ringing endorsement. And to me, who works in IT, it's a bloody annoying. We've already implemented the use-application-dns.net NXDOMAIN cana
by throw0101a 7y ago
> To me, that's a ringing endorsement.
And to me, who works in IT, it's a bloody annoying.
We've already implemented the use-application-dns.net NXDOMAIN canary at work because after some testing Firefox breaks a bunch of apps because of split-horizon DNS.
There's already (at least) two malware that's using DoH to get around network monitoring:
* https://www.zdnet.com/article/first-ever-malware-strain-spotted-abusing-new-doh-dns-over-https-protocol/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/first-ever-malware-strain-spot...
* https://www.zdnet.com/article/psixbot-malware-upgraded-with-google-dns-over-https-sexploitation-kit/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/psixbot-malware-upgraded-with-...
If the host is compromised we can no longer trust end-point monitoring, and with DoH/ESNI we lose network monitoring. Awesome. Great work.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- tptacek 7y agoI absolutely understand why it's bloody annoying for network operators. What I don't understand is why any home user should trade even the tiniest iota of their privacy to make your life any easier. You get paid to deal with these problems.
- vetinari 7y agoIn certain situations, even home users are in the same position as network operators. The processes running on their machines will use exactly these same mechanisms to escape the user control. The last few years have shown, that big brand names are not to be trusted, and their interests, as implemented in their software, are not aligned with user interests. In a way, we are getting back full-circle to Stallman. DoH+ESNI will make it even harder.
- tptacek 7y agoI don't understand whether you're saying that DoH+ESNI will make it harder for malicious network operators to compromise user privacy (clearly true) or whether DoH+ESNI will make it harder for home users to run their networks as if they were enterprise networks. It would be a genuinely weird new take to argue that encrypted SNI was somehow harmful to privacy.
- vetinari 7y agoWhat is privacy? The same way the home user can get privacy from the network operator, can malware get its privacy from the home user. This is amplified by moving DNS resolution into applications, Mozilla style. Now even the operating system or local firewall applications (Little Snitch, etc) can't know, where the processes are connecting. Again, the application vendors can have objectives that are not aligned with the users. It is a mistake to conflate the home users with random applications running on their computers.
- tptacek 7y agoThis argument doesn't make any sense. TLS SNI hostnames should remain unencrypted to help user privacy?
- vetinari 7y agoNo. The argument is, that a random process should not be a world into itself; there should be a way to check on what it is doing. It does not have to be network based, it can be done by another process on the local machine. Things like DNS should be done by the OS, with hooks for the monitoring. It should be not be done by the application, with zero transparency to the owner. The system resolver, on the other hand, can use DoH/DoT/ESNI/whatever. Giving random processes unlimited, uncontrolled and uncontrollable access to Internet is disaster waiting to happen. Quite similar to what happened to applications on Android.
- tptacek 7y agoWhat does the system resolver have to do with encrypting TLS SNI?
- vetinari 7y agoWith the privacy. I don't know, whether I'm expressing badly due to English not being my native language, or where is the problem in understanding. I hope that you are not just misunderstanding intentionally. So once again: The combination of ESNI and DNS resolving inside applications (and not OS, not checked by some user agent) provides privacy to application, not users. That application might or might not have its objectives aligned with the users; more often than not, it will focus on interests of its vendor instead. So conflating privacy for application with privacy for user is mistake. By applications using custom DNS+ESNI, the user loses control over who the application communicates with, he just sees that it can send and receive blobs. What it is sending out, to whom, is and will be unknown. That is the negative wrt user's privacy, compared to which the current Android ecosystem is squeaky clean.
- akerl_ 7y agoIf you were counting on DNS and SNI monitoring to detect compromised endpoints, you’ve lost anyways, because malware can chose its own dns resolution method and avoid SNI regardless of what the OS or Firefox are set up to do.
- tialaramex 7y agoEven better, Malware can (popular malware doesn't so far as I can see today, but could if other methods stopped working) straight up lie in SNI and in the old TLS 1.2 plaintext Certificate message, and produce plausible yet entirely misleading results in your inspection apparatus. A real client expects the encrypted parts that follow Certificate to match up and should abort if they don't, but malware is under no obligation to do that, and a 3rd party which can't decrypt the rest of the handshake won't know e.g. Malware client: SNI for bigbank.example (knowing bigbank will have been excluded from snooping rules at the target) Malware C&C server: 100% Legitimate Certificate copied from bigbank.example Malware client: Cool, let's continue with encrypted setup (ignores the pretence that this is bigbank.example and now communicates with the C&C server undetected and encrypted knowing the logs will just show "bigbank.example") "Security" products can't protect against this without snooping each and every single transaction, but many will be deployed by ignorant/ well-meaning people who don't understand how this works and thus that the products can't actually do what they appear to offer to do.
- throw0101a 7y ago> ... because malware can chose its own dns resolution method ... Except before DoH I could monitor DNS: with plain DNS ("Do53") it is completely visible, and with DoT it is on a different port so it can be filtered. Which is Paul Vixie's point: DoH takes control away from network owners, like me and my home Asus, and me and work.
- akerl_ 7y agoYes, but the malware isn't required to use port 53 or "plain DNS" at all... Regardless of what the OS or Firefox or whatever existing app uses, a malicious binary could just use DoH, or just make an HTTP request directly to an IP, or skip HTTP/DNS entirely and fling data out over UDP to an external IP. Put another way: if your issue is that DoH removes your ability to catch DNS requests from malware, your issue isn't with users enabling DoH, or with app devs defaulting their apps to DoH, your issue is with the concept of non-DNS network protocols. Even if DoH was never standardized, an attacker isn't required to make lookups on port 53 as you desire.