> Establishing intent requires mind-reading Philosophical discussion of intent, unlike legal discussion, isn't necessarily concerned with what you can external

> Establishing intent requires mind-reading Philosophical discussion of intent, unlike legal discussion, isn't necessarily concerned with what you can externally establish. It is still useful for answering questions about your own conduct, like: "would I be lying if I say something I know to be false, which I don't expect others to believe?" I think another problem (both in philosophy and law) is that intent is not binary. If I do something without wishing a particular outcome, knowing that such outcome may likely happen, and not attempting to mitigate it, is it intentional? For instance, if I knowingly made a false accusation that some person is a criminal, uncaring whether it was perceived as sarcasm or truth, and some listeners understood it to be a truthful accusation, what is my level of culpability for libel?